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Sovereign bond contracts are thought to consist primarily of boilerplate. That 
is, except for a handful of custom terms, the contracts are assumed to adopt highly 
standardized provisions that are functionally identical to those used in other bond 
contracts. Because standardized terms may be “sticky,” this description invokes 
significant theoretical baggage. It implies that market participants may select 
widely used terms over terms that match their unique preferences. 
This Article explores the phenomenon of standardization in the context of a 
particular contracting choice: whether to include an arbitration clause in a 
sovereign bond contract. These contracts are widely believed to adopt boilerplate 
dispute resolution provisions calling for litigation in foreign courts, typically in 
New York or England, even though some parties (by hypothesis) would prefer 
arbitration. The usual explanation for this discrepancy invokes the inherent 
“stickiness” of standard terms. This Article contests this explanation, 
demonstrating that contracts are more varied than is often assumed and arguing 
that a general preference for litigation, rather than default rule stickiness, may best 
explain the relatively infrequent use of arbitration. In the process, the Article 
provides a systematic empirical look at the manner in which these bond contracts 
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structure the process of enforcing sovereign debt obligations and raises broader 
implications for the study of contract innovation and change. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Sovereign bond contracts are thought to consist mostly of boilerplate. That 
is, except for a handful of custom terms, the contracts are assumed to adopt 
highly standardized provisions that are functionally identical to those used in 
other bond contracts.1 The assumption of standardization extends to 
enforcement-related terms, including terms in which the issuer consents to be 
sued in the event of a default. Thus, the “standard” choice of forum term is 
presumed to call for litigation in foreign courts, typically in New York (for New 
York-law bonds) or England (for English-law bonds).2 
To describe sovereign bond contracts as “standardized,” or “boilerplate,” is 
to invoke significant theoretical baggage. For a variety of reasons, standardized 
terms may be “sticky.”3 Parties who adopt a standard term may obtain benefits, 
while those who depart from the standard may incur costs, and these benefits 
and costs may induce even sophisticated parties to select a standard term over a 
custom term that matches their unique preferences. Thus, the presumed choice 
of forum standard may not evidence a preference for litigation over arbitration 
among participants in the sovereign debt markets. This is because the litigation 
term is thought to be a sticky default.4 
The assumptions underlying this “stickiness” explanation, however, are 
largely untested. Do sovereign bonds really contain standardized dispute 
resolution terms, and do these terms indeed eschew arbitration for litigation? If 
so, why attribute these contracting practices to the stickiness of forum selection 
terms rather than, say, a widely held preference for litigation? This Article 
explores these questions. In the process, it provides the first systematic empirical 
look at the manner in which sovereign bond contracts structure the process of 
enforcing sovereign debt obligations. This analysis reveals a richer and more 
nuanced picture of how some of the world’s most sophisticated contracting 
parties structure the dispute resolution process, and of the likely impact of 
standardization on their choices. 
Part I begins with an introduction to this unique contracting context, one in 
which the threat of legal enforcement plays a relatively minor role. Part I also 
introduces the presumptive standard set of choice of forum and other 
enforcement-related terms. That standard eschews arbitration in favor of 
litigation before creditor-friendly courts in New York or England. Part I closes 
 
1. See infra note 18 and accompanying text for prior research characterizing sovereign bonds as 
boilerplate. 
2. Karen Halverson Cross, Arbitration as a Means of Resolving Sovereign Debt Disputes, 17 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 335, 338 (2006); Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in 
International Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 711, 732 n.131 (2007). 
3. Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 651, 653 (2006). 
4. Cross, supra note 2, at 337; Waibel, supra note 2, at 732 n.131. 
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by exploring a common explanation for the widespread use of this presumed 
standard. This explanation posits that bond contracts choose litigation not 
because market participants prefer it to arbitration, but because forum selection 
clauses are sticky. 
The foregoing discussion suggests the ambiguity inherent in highly 
standardized contracts. Do parties simply prefer the standard, or does 
standardization deter contract innovation and change? Answering these 
questions requires some prior belief as to the parties’ likely preferences, as well 
as an analysis of the contracts themselves. Part II engages these questions, 
beginning with an assessment of the merits of arbitration as a means of resolving 
sovereign debt disputes. I do not purport to offer a definitive resolution. I 
suggest, however, that few participants in the sovereign debt markets presently 
have strong reasons to prefer arbitration. That conclusion implies that arbitration 
clauses may appear infrequently in sovereign bond contracts for reasons having 
little or nothing to do with contract stickiness. 
Part II next reports findings from an analysis of sovereign bond contracts, 
including at least one issuance from virtually every major (and most minor) 
issuers of New York- or English-law bonds over the last twenty years. As it turns 
out, enforcement-related terms vary to a surprising degree across the different 
issuers in my sample. With respect to choice of forum terms, more than twenty 
percent of the issuers depart in some way from the presumptive standard, 
including nearly ten percent whose bonds include arbitration clauses. Different 
issuers also vary in the degree to which they waive sovereign immunity from suit, 
from execution, or both. This variance across issuers, however, coexists with 
intra-issuer contracting stasis. The issuers in my sample may choose nonstandard 
enforcement terms, but they rarely change their own established contracting 
practices. 
Part III explores the implications of these findings. Contrary to the 
stickiness explanation, actual contracting practices suggest that market 
participants generally prefer litigation to arbitration in this context. Most issuers 
provide for litigation but include broad sovereign immunity waivers in their bond 
contracts. This practice captures some of the advantages claimed for arbitration, 
without incurring the potential costs and uncertainty associated with a relatively 
untested, and unsubsidized, disputing forum. Moreover, when there are unique 
reasons to prefer arbitration—as when the issuer’s courts are unlikely to enforce 
foreign court judgments—many (though not all) issuers provide for it. And 
although issuers rarely change their existing dispute resolution terms, they 
presently have little reason to do so. 
Part III closes by briefly situating these findings within the broader body of 
research into sovereign debt and, more generally, contract innovation and 
change. At a basic level, the findings serve as a reminder that actual contracting 
practices are often more diverse than expected. This is especially true across the 
different issuers in the sample, suggesting that robust models of sovereign debt 
contracting practices must take into account a more heterogeneous set of terms 
than has previously been thought to exist. The findings also implicate a larger 
debate over when and where contract change is likely to occur. Much contracts 
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scholarship focuses on innovation by larger and “high-status” players—those 
whose economic strength and reputational capital make them ideal “first 
movers.” But the variance in enforcement-related terms tells a different story. In 
particular, the use of arbitration by relatively minor players in the sovereign debt 
world calls for greater attention to the forces that drive innovation among less- 
established and lower-status players. 
 
I. INTRODUCING THE STANDARD 
 
A. Sovereign Debt and the Role of Legal Enforcement 
In many ways, sovereign bonds are typical debt instruments: tradable bonds 
by which governments raise funds from investors, often residents of foreign 
countries.5 In loans to private borrowers, the threat of legal enforcement is a 
significant inducement for the borrower to repay (and thus, for the lender to 
make the loan in the first place). Defaulting borrowers face the prospect of 
having their property seized and sold in satisfaction of the debt. For sovereign 
borrowers, however, the reality is different. After a default, the sovereign’s own 
courts may be unable or unwilling to enforce the debt, and for a number of 
reasons courts in other countries may not offer reliable means of legal 
enforcement. 
One reason for this is the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which until the 
latter half of the twentieth century conferred on foreign states absolute immunity 
from suit in many jurisdictions, including the United States.6 The doctrine has 
been weakened in many jurisdictions, including the United States and United 
Kingdom,7 so that sovereigns generally now retain their immunity from suit for 
public or governmental, but not for private or commercial, acts.8 Nevertheless, 
even if a foreign state is subject to suit and a creditor can obtain a judgment for 





5. Waibel, supra note 2, at 719.  Historically,  emerging  market  governments  “borrowed  from  
foreign residents in foreign currency  under  foreign  law,”  although  this  is  increasingly  no  longer  the  
case. Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH U. L. 
REV. 1627, 1632–33 (2006). See generally Anna Gelpern, Domestic Bonds, Credit Derivatives, and the 
Next Transformation of Sovereign Debt, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147 (2008) (discussing growth in  
domestic debt in emerging markets). 
6. See Turkmani v. Rep. of Bol., 193 F. Supp. 2d 165, 170–71 (D.D.C. 2002) (explaining that U.S. 
government recognized absolute theory of foreign sovereign immunity until 1952). 
7. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,  28  U.S.C.  §§  1602–1611  (2006);  State  Immunity  
Act, 1978, c. 33, § 2-11 (U.K.), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123. 
8. HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 124–216, 272–74 (2002) (describing varying 
approaches to sovereign immunity throughout world, as well as restrictive theory of sovereign  
immunity); Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1075–76 (2004) (describing enactment in U.S. of 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976). 
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of legal enforcement.9 The issuer’s assets may be located primarily within its own 
borders, where a creditor’s prospects of seizing them are rather dim.10 And even 
if the issuer keeps assets in foreign jurisdictions, those assets may be immune 
from execution.11 For example, under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(“FSIA”) a foreign state’s property located within the United States will likely 
be immune from execution unless the property is used for a commercial activity 
and either the state has waived its immunity from execution or the property “is 
or was used for the commercial activity upon which the [creditor’s] claim is 
based.”12 Thus, the coercive mechanisms available to secure payment when 
private borrowers fail to pay are of limited use in the sovereign debt context. 
The lack of reliable means to enforce sovereign debt obligations has led to a 
debate over what role, if any, the threat of legal enforcement plays in enabling 
sovereign borrowing.13 Under most accounts, reputational constraints—primarily 
the threat of exclusion from future borrowing—serve as the primary inducement 
to debt repayment.14 The threat of legal enforcement, however, likely plays at 
least some role. At a minimum, the threat of enforcement may impose indirect 
costs—for example, by restricting the sovereign’s ability to conduct foreign trade 




9. See Andrei Shleifer, Will the Sovereign Debt Market Survive?, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 85, 87 
(2003) (“Because borrowers in sovereign debt markets are, well, sovereign, creditors have virtually no 
rights.”). 
10. Id. (“Creditors cannot grab assets in the country. The most they can do is to seize a few 
airplanes or barges of oil, which does not get them far except as a strategy of harassment.”); see also 
William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004) (“[D]efaulting sovereigns try their best not to leave valuables lying 
around.”). 
11. See William W. Park, When the Borrower and the Banker Are at Odds: The Interaction of 
Judge and Arbitrator in Trans-Border Finance, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1323, 1342–43 (1991) (discussing 
immunity from execution under U.S. law). 
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1), (2). 
13. Compare Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?, 79 AM. 
ECON. REV. 43, 43–44 (1989)  (modeling  conditions  under  which  legal  or  political  sanctions  are 
necessary to support sovereign borrowing), with Harold L. Cole et al., Default, Settlement,  and  
Signalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt, 36 INT’L ECON. REV. 365, 
365, 369–71 (1995) (modeling process in which defaulting countries settle defaulted debt  to signal  their  
intent to repay future loans), and William B. English, Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default: 
American State Debts in the 1840’s, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 259, 259, 267–72 (1996) (arguing that defaulted 
U.S. states repaid debt in order to maintain access to capital markets, rather than to avoid legal, 
military, or trade sanctions). 
14. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 10, at 14 (describing reputation theory as “the dominant 
view”); Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agreements and the Limits of 
Coercion, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 551, 588–89 (“What most powerfully explains the willingness of lenders to 
treat these promises as credible is a conviction that governments will seek private financing of public  
debt into the indefinite future.”). 
15. Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt, 97 J. 
POL. ECON. 155, 158–59 (1989); see also Bratton & Gulati, supra note 10, at 15–16 (describing 
enforcement theory of sovereign debt). 
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Moreover, while admittedly rare, individual creditors have had some notable 
successes in obtaining and executing judgments against defaulted sovereigns.16 
Because enforcement matters (at least to a degree), and because sovereign 
borrowers default with some frequency,17 it is hardly surprising that sovereign 
bond contracts contain detailed terms pertaining to legal enforcement. Most 
observers take it as a given that these terms, and indeed most terms in sovereign 
bond contracts, are functionally identical—that is, boilerplate.18 Thus, bond 
contracts are presumed to contain a “standard” set of terms governing how and 
where disputes related to the bonds will be resolved. 
 
B. The Presumed Dispute Resolution “Standard” 
As an example of the dispute resolution standard, consider the “Governing 
Law and Jurisdiction” clause in a recent bond offering by the Lebanese 
Republic, as described in the prospectus excerpt reprinted as Appendix A. The 
clause conforms to one of two perceived standards, reflecting an initial choice 
between the law and courts of New York and the law and courts of England.19 
Thus, the “standard” begins by selecting between relatively stable and 
predictable bodies of law applied by the courts of major (and competing) 
financial centers, where cultural and economic factors may exert pressure to 
enforce loan agreements.20 The dispute resolution provisions in the Lebanese 
bonds choose New York law and provide that the issuer will submit to the 
nonexclusive jurisdiction of state or federal courts in Manhattan.21 
 
16. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 8, at 1084–87 (describing litigation by the vulture fund Elliott 
Associates and similar attempts to enforce sovereign debt obligations). 
17. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Serial Default and the “Paradox” of Rich-to-Poor 
Capital Flows, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 53, 53 (2004) (“Throughout history, governments have 
demonstrated that ‘serial default’ is the rule, not the exception.”); Shleifer, supra note 9, at 87 
(“[O]verborrowing, default, and limited repayment are completely normal and expected by both 
borrowers and lenders.”). 
18. Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the Shadow of the 
International Order, 53 EMORY L.J. 691, 713–21 (2004); Cross, supra note 2, at 337; Gelpern & Gulati, 
supra note 5, at 1628–29; Waibel, supra note 2, at 732 n.131; see also Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, 
Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 
929, 932 n.7 (2004) (discussing assumption of standardization in sovereign bond contracts). 
19. See Cross, supra note 2, at 338 (describing New York and London as “creditor friendly” 
jurisdictions). 
20. E.g., LEE C. BUCHHEIT,  HOW  TO NEGOTIATE EUROCURRENCY LOAN AGREEMENTS  134  (2d 
ed. 2006) (noting that, from lenders’ perspective, choice of law reflects  desire  for  enforcement  
litigation to occur in jurisdictions whose law “strongly favours the enforcement of financial contracts 
according to their terms”); Fisch & Gentile, supra note 8, at 1079–81 (describing negative reaction of 
New York financial community to Second Circuit ruling invoking act of state doctrine to bar creditor 
litigation, and successful efforts to reverse decision). 
21. “The Fiscal Agency Agreement and the Notes shall be construed  and  interpreted  in  
accordance with the law of the State of New York . . . without reference to conflicts of laws principles. 
The Republic irrevocably agrees . . . that the courts of the State of New York and of the United States 
sitting in The City of New York, Borough of Manhattan, shall have non-exclusive jurisdiction to settle 
any disputes . . . . ” THE LEBANESE REP., BASE PROSPECTUS 99 (Apr. 4, 2007) (detailing U.S. 
$22,000,000,000 Global Medium-Term Note Program). As for why the clause specifies courts in 
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The clause next contains a package of terms addressing other enforcement- 
related matters. These terms include: 
• An expansive waiver of sovereign immunity from both jurisdiction 
and execution for lawsuits related to the bonds.22 Even without such 
a waiver, the issuer would likely be susceptible to suit in the United 
States.23 The broad contractual waiver, however, permits 
bondholders to avoid litigating whether the particular transaction 
falls within the “commercial activity” exception to sovereign 
immunity from jurisdiction.24 Moreover, because foreign states also 
enjoy broad immunity from attachment and execution against their 
property,25 the contractual waiver may expand the scope of property 
available to satisfy bondholder claims.26 
• Provisions carefully limiting the Republic’s waiver of jurisdictional 
immunity to actions related to the bonds, and exempting property 
used for official purposes from its waiver of immunity from 
execution.27 
• A term designating an official to accept service of process in actions 
relating to the bonds,28 thereby easing a significant practical 
difficulty associated with suing a foreign state.29 
 
Manhattan, see BUCHHEIT, supra note 20, at 137. “Have you ever been to the South Bronx? Have you 
ever spent two consecutive weeks in Troy, New York?” Id. 
22. THE LEBANESE REP., supra note 21, at 99–100 (“To the extent that the Republic may in any 
jurisdiction claim or acquire for itself or its assets immunity (sovereign or otherwise) from suit, 
execution, attachment (whether in aid of execution, before judgment or otherwise) or other legal 
process (whether through service or notice or otherwise), the Republic irrevocably agrees for the 
benefit of the Holders of Notes not to claim, and irrevocably waives, such immunity, to the fullest 
extent permitted by the laws of such jurisdiction.”). 
23. See Rep. of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614–17 (1992) (holding that issuance of  
bonds is “commercial activity” for which foreign state is not entitled to immunity under Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2006) (creating subject matter jurisdiction 
for foreign sovereigns in United States courts under certain enumerated exceptions, including  
commercial activities with connection to United States). 
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (allowing United States courts jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns 
when the sovereign has waived its immunity explicitly or by implication). 
25. Id. § 1609. 
26. Compare id. § 1610(a)(1) (property used for commercial  activity  in  United  States  is  not  
immune if foreign state has waived immunity), with id. § 1610(a)(2)  (property  used  for  commercial  
activity in United States is not immune if “the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon 
which the claim is based” (emphasis added)). 
27. THE LEBANESE REP., supra note 21, at 100 (“The waiver of immunity in this paragraph shall 
have the fullest scope permitted under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 of the United  
States and is intended to be irrevocable for purposes of such Act but  shall  otherwise  constitute  a 
limited and specific waiver for the purpose of the Fiscal Agency Agreement and the Notes and under     
no circumstances shall it be interpreted as a general waiver by the Republic or a waiver of immunity in 
respect of property that is used solely or principally for official purposes . . .”). 
28. Id. (“The Republic irrevocably appoints the person who from time to time is the Consul of 
the Republic in The City of New York as it [sic] agent in the United States to receive service of 
process in any Related Proceedings in The City of New York based on or in connection with the Fiscal 
Agency Agreement or any of the Notes.”). 
29. BUCHHEIT, supra note 20, at 137–38. 
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Thus, the “standard” dispute resolution clause begins with a choice between 
the law and courts of New York and the law and courts of England. In either 
case, the clause also contains a package of terms that waive the sovereign’s 
immunity from suit and (in this case) execution and that address practical 
litigation-related concerns such as service of process. At the same time, the 
standard clause takes care to ensure that the issuer retains its more expansive 
sovereign immunity from suit in other contexts and does not face seizure of 
important public or governmental property.30 
 
C. Sovereign Bonds and Theories of Default Rule “Stickiness” 
To describe sovereign bond contracts as “standardized” or “boilerplate” is 
to invoke significant theoretical baggage. Suppose, for example, that participants 
in sovereign debt markets had reason to favor arbitration over litigation in the 
event of a default. Shouldn’t sovereign bond contracts quickly incorporate such a 
value-maximizing term? The answer, many would assert, is “No.”31 This answer 
implicates a body of contract theory exploring the ways in which standardization 
can deter contract innovation.32 A number of theoretical approaches predict that 
parties will be reluctant to depart from default terms.33 Of these, network theory 
is the most prominent in the sovereign debt context.34 
 
1. Network and Learning Effects and Switching Costs 
Why would sophisticated contracting parties agree to a set of standardized 
terms when they would prefer different ones? One answer is that standardized 
terms confer value because many have used them in the past (“learning effects”), 
because many use them now or are likely to do so in the future (“network 
effects”), and because there are costs associated with producing new terms 
(“switching costs”).35 
 
30. These latter exemptions serve an obvious function: “If a foreign bank were to attempt to levy 
against the Presidential Palace or the state orphanage, for example, this would almost certainly prompt 
a phone call to the unfortunate lawyer who negotiated the loan agreement on behalf of the sovereign 
borrower.” Id. at 143. 
31. E.g., Cross, supra note 2, at 374–77 (extending network theory to choice of forum terms in 
sovereign bonds); Waibel, supra note 2, at 732 n.131 (disputing value of arbitration under 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes but noting that sovereign bonds “display 
tremendous inertia against change (for example, to include arbitration clauses)”). 
32. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the 
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 289–305 (1985) 
(exploring how state provision of default rules may combine with other barriers to impede contract 
innovation). 
33. Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 3, at 655–60. 
34. See, e.g., Ahdieh, supra note 18, at 710–28 (using network theory to explain patterns of stasis 
and change in sovereign bond contracts); Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 932 & n.7 (focusing on 
inclusion of collective action clauses in sovereign bonds governed by New York law, and presenting 
evidence consistent with network theory); Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 5, at 1629 (explaining 
application of network theory to complex financial contracts, including sovereign bonds). 
35. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting 
(or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719–29 (1997). 
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For example, by choosing a term that has been widely used in the past, 
contracting parties may benefit from prior users’ experience with the term. Early 
users of contract terms thus generate positive externalities from which later users 
benefit.36 These learning effects may include certainty as to the term’s meaning 
and validity resulting from an established body of precedent.37 Prior users may 
have eliminated errors in the term’s formulation over multiple drafting 
iterations.38 Common terms also may be familiar to important third parties, such 
as lawyers and investment bankers, who have developed expertise associated 
with the term.39 Importantly, where contracts are actively traded, the use of a 
standard term also may reduce the cost to investors and analysts of pricing the 
contract.40 
Similar benefits—termed “network effects”—may accrue to parties who 
select terms that are commonly used now, or that will be commonly used in the 
future.41 Thus, as use of a term becomes widespread, judicial interpretation may 
clarify its meaning, and third parties, including investors, may develop expertise 
in evaluating the term’s significance and pricing implications.42 These network 
effects also constitute positive, inter-firm externalities.43 But unlike learning 
effects, which flow only from early to later users of a contract term, “[n]etwork 
externalities run in two directions in the sense that all users benefit from one 
another’s contemporaneous use of the product, regardless of when they started 
using it.”44 
Finally, an analogous set of intra-firm benefits may accrue from the 
repeated use of a contract term within a single firm.45 When present, these 
benefits may result in switching costs that deter the firm from adopting a new 
term.46 Parties who adopt nonstandard terms, or who depart from their past 
practices, may incur error costs. Judges may interpret the new term in 
unanticipated ways,47 or the term may fail to address an unforeseen 
contingency.48 For actively traded contracts, moreover, investors may have 




36.  Id. at 724. 
37.  Id. at 722. 
38. Id. at 721. But see Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in “Legalese,” 77 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 59, 60, 80–81 (2001) (noting that multiple iterations may fail to correct, or may even worsen, 
contract defects). 
39. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 723. 
40. Id. at 723–24; see also Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 943 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting 
that uniformity of contract terms makes it easier for investors and advisors to compare issues). 
41. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 725. 
42.  Id. at 726. 
43.  Id. at 727. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 727–29. 
46. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 727. 
47. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 32, at 283–84 (discussing risk of interpretation error). 
48. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 720. 
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cost of assessing its value.49 Beyond this, use of a nonstandard term may signal 
negative information to the market, perhaps an increased likelihood of default in 
a lending transaction.50 Thus, 
[s]witching may be costly for a single firm because it takes time and 
effort to produce a new term that works . . . [and t]here is no guarantee 
that investors, analysts, and judges will interpret a new term in a way 
that is favorable to its original proponent or . . . that others will adopt 
the term in the foreseeable future.51 
These benefits and costs have implications for the degree of standardization 
we should expect in contracts. As applied to contracting behavior, network 
theory posits that learning and network benefits may lead contracts to be more 
standardized than would otherwise be the case.52 Parties may forego a value- 
maximizing term in favor of a “standardized term subject to network 
externalities.”53 Likewise, switching costs may deter parties from revising 
existing contracts, either to take advantage of a market “standard” or to choose 
a nonstandard term that is nevertheless superior to a term in the firm’s existing 
contracts.54 Put differently: network theory posits that standardization can serve 
as a barrier to contract innovation and change.55 
 
49. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 
757, 785 (1995); see also FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND RISK 
SHARING 122 (1994) (“If a novel security must earn an uncertainty premium, there is an incentive to 
issue standard securities which do not bear this premium. The private returns from standardization 
may lead to coordination failure, that is, the market may fail to innovate, or it may coordinate on the 
‘wrong’ security.”). 
50. Ahdieh, supra note 18, at 716–16; Klausner, supra note 49, at 785. For a related point, see 
Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 3, at 652. 
[I]n the presence of a familiar and commonly utilized background provision . . . a transactor 
might fear that proposing an opt-out from the default will dissuade his potential 
counterparty from entering into the agreement. The fear is that the counterparty will suspect 
that the proposer’s decision to deviate from the norm and use an unfamiliar provision hides 
some unknown problem. 
Id.  
51. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 5, at 1629. 
52. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 729. Conversely, in some cases contracting parties may 
have insufficient incentives to adopt terms that will confer network externalities on future users. Id. at 
730. But see Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 931 n.2 (noting that, to extent sovereign bond contracts 
are already heavily standardized, this concern is less likely). 
53. Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 930–31. 
54. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 727–29. 
55. The impact of learning and network effects on contracting behavior has been questioned on 
theoretical and empirical grounds. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications 
of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 569–76, 587 (1998) (expressing skepticism that 
contract terms generate significant interpretive network effects); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. 
Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Externalities, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 82, 128 (2001) 
(concluding, from study of closely held firms’ choice between limited liability company and limited 
liability partnership forms, that characteristics of relevant business form were more significant factors 
in choice of organizational form than were network externalities). Nevertheless, it is widely assumed 
that sovereign bond contracts are highly standardized and network theory is commonly invoked in 
analyses of sovereign bond contracts. See generally Choi & Gulati, supra note 18 (arguing sovereign 
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2. Network Theory as Applied to Enforcement-Related Terms 
Recently, there has been increased interest in arbitration’s potential as a 
forum for resolving sovereign debt disputes. Some scholars and advocates have 
argued that issuers, investors, or both would be better off arbitrating sovereign 
debt disputes, especially before the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), than litigating those disputes before New York 
or English courts.56 The case for arbitration principally rests on two asserted 
benefits: neutrality and enforceability.57 The first benefit rests on the claim that 
arbitrators—because selected and paid by the disputants—are less susceptible to 
political and other pressures than are locally elected or politically appointed 
judges.58 For this reason, issuers might prefer arbitration to litigation before 
foreign courts.59 The second benefit rests on the claim that, in some cases, 
arbitration awards may be easier to enforce than court judgments.60 Under the 
FSIA, for example, a successful arbitration claimant may be able to attach and 
execute upon a broader range of property within the United States than a 
successful litigant in court.61 And even within the sovereign’s own borders, a 
number of multilateral treaties may facilitate the enforcement of arbitration 
awards.62 
The belief that arbitration offers these advantages,63 paired with the 
assumption  that  New  York-  and  English-law  bonds  adopt  boilerplate terms 
 
 
bond contracts remain standardized due to factors other than preference); Gelpern & Gulati, supra 
note 5 (stating that prevalent explanation for boilerplate is network effects). 
56. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 2, at 354–65 (arguing that arbitration offers benefits to issuers and 
creditors); Memorandum from Owen C. Pell to the  Global  Committee  of  Argentina  Bondholders  
(Feb. 15, 2005), available at http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=140069 (suggesting that 
Argentina would voluntarily comply with ICSID awards). 
57. See generally Cross, supra note 2, for a forceful articulation of arbitration’s potential 
advantages. 
58. Cross, supra note 2, at 355. 
59. Id. For a related point about likely state preferences for dependent adjudicators such as 
arbitrators, see Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 32 (2005). 
60. Cross, supra note 2, at 356–65; Waibel, supra note 2, at 758; Memorandum from Owen C. Pell 
to the Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders, supra note 56. 
61. Cross, supra note 2, at 358–59; Memorandum from Owen C. Pell to the Global Committee of 
Argentina Bondholders, supra note 56. 
62. See Cross, supra note 2, at 361–62 (noting that one advantage of ICSID arbitration is that 
ICSID awards are directly enforceable in member states’ courts); Waibel, supra note 2, at 758 (stating 
that use of ICSID changes sovereign debt adjudication “from a private, into an international, dispute 
between states” and that “noncompliance with an ICSID award amounts to an international—and 
very public—breach”); Memorandum from Owen C. Pell to the Global Committee of Argentina 
Bondholders, supra note 56 (explaining that, while enforcement of U.S. judgments is uncertain in 
other countries, ICSID judgments are treated as judgments rendered by courts of the enforcing 
jurisdiction). 
63. Not all agree that arbitration of sovereign debt disputes would be a beneficial development. 
See Waibel, supra note 2, at 715, 757–58 (objecting that ICSID arbitration could “blow a hole” in 
sovereign’s ability to restructure sovereign debt instruments). 
12 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
 
calling for litigation in New York or England,64 gives rise to a puzzle: Why don’t 
bonds provide for arbitration? Network theory seems to offer a ready answer.65 
Bond contracts governed by New York or English law seek to tap into relatively 
robust bodies of law regarding the enforceability of sovereign debt obligations 
and the application of sovereign immunity and other defenses.66 Widespread use 
of choice of forum terms calling for litigation in New York or England may have 
contributed to the development of this law. Likewise, widespread use of New 
York and English courts may have developed expertise among members of the 
relevant legal and judicial communities.67 By adopting the standard choice of 
forum term, new bonds might access (and continue to generate) these benefits. 
Similar benefits could be hypothesized for other enforcement-related terms, such 
as sovereign immunity waivers. For example, bonds that adopt boilerplate 
language might tap into existing precedent interpreting the waiver, access 
professional expertise as to the term’s meaning and validity, and reduce the cost 
to market participants of pricing the immunity term.68 
Parties who select nonstandard dispute resolution terms may forego these 
benefits and incur a related set of costs. In theory, of course, contracting parties 
may obtain the benefit of their chosen law in any forum. Arbitrators, for 
example, will likely honor contract terms instructing them to apply New York 
law. But judicial review of arbitral awards is generally limited,69 and arbitrators 
have a reputation—perhaps undeserved—of basing their decisions on equitable 
principles.70 Arbitration may also raise procedural uncertainties, such as whether 
 
64. See Cross, supra note 2, at 338–41, 340 & n.22 (identifying Brazil and Ukraine—and possibly 
other non-EU member issuers located in former Eastern bloc—as only nations to include arbitration 
clauses in sovereign debt contracts); Waibel, supra note 2, at 732 n.131 (“[S]overeign bonds are 
‘conservative’ financial instruments whose contractual terms display tremendous inertia against 
change (for example, to include arbitration clauses)”). 
65. Cross, supra note 2, at 374; Waibel, supra note 2, at 732 n.131. 
66. See, e.g., BUCHHEIT, supra note 20, at 130 (stating New York and London have well- 
developed law, which results in predictable interpretation of contract terms); Fisch & Gentile, supra 
note 8, at 1075–88, 1097 (discussing developments in sovereign debt litigation and legal doctrine). 
67. On the development of law related to sovereign debt obligations, primarily but not 
exclusively by courts located in New York, see Fisch & Gentile, supra note 8, at 1075–88. 
68. For example, U.S. law requires separate waivers of the sovereign’s immunity from suit and 
immunity from execution. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1) (2006); FOX, supra note 8, at 146. Selecting New 
York courts as the situs for litigation would help ensure that an immunity waiver referencing the 
sovereign “or its assets” would be interpreted to waive immunity from execution. See, e.g., Karaha 
Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 313 F.3d 70, 82–83 (2d Cir. 
2002) (finding sovereign immunity waived because contract included such language).  In  truth,  
however, judicial opinions interpreting contractual waivers of immunity are rare, so it is questionable 
whether these contract terms generate significant interpretive network effects. Perhaps a better 
explanation is that the widespread selection of courts in New York and England develops 
constituencies—such as lawyers and investment bankers—with the power to influence court practices. 
See supra note 20 and accompanying text for a discussion of how cultural and economic factors may 
influence choice of law provisions. 
69. See, e.g., Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 
V, done June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (stating that recognition and enforcement of 
arbitration award may be refused only under certain enumerated conditions). 
70. E.g., Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 
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creditors will have recourse to summary enforcement procedures and 
preliminary measures of relief often available in court.71 Such uncertainty might 
impact borrowing costs. Sovereign bonds are actively traded on secondary 
markets, and investors may demand a premium if they are to hold an unfamiliar 
security.72 Moreover, the choice of a nonstandard term may signal adverse 
information about the issuer’s likelihood of default.73 After all, why tinker with 
perfectly good enforcement boilerplate unless the issuer or its underwriters are 
already thinking about default?74 
Nevertheless, while the foregoing story is plausible, it is no more than that. 
It is not self-evident that arbitration offers benefits in this context, that sovereign 
bonds indeed adopt boilerplate enforcement terms, or that any uniformity in 
contracting practices should be attributed to contract stickiness rather than 
preference.75 In any event, the assumptions underlying the network story remain 
largely untested.76 Do participants in the sovereign debt markets really have 
reason to prefer arbitration? If they do, does standardization pose a meaningful 
barrier to contract change for such a sophisticated set of parties?77 These 
questions are complicated by the ambiguity inherent in any given set of 
contracting practices. A high degree of standardization across sovereign bonds 
need not imply suboptimal contracting; market participants may simply prefer 
the standard term.78 Likewise, variance across bond terms might or might not 
evidence optimal contracting practices by parties with diverse preferences.79 To 
 
 
TUL. L. REV. 39, 42–46 (1999) (stating that arbitration has traditionally been perceived as “speedy, 
cheap, and equitable”). 
71. See Cross, supra note 2, at 371–74 (discussing uncertainty associated with whether summary 
procedures and interim relief, both available under New York law, are available in arbitration). 
72. Ahdieh, supra note 18, at 714; Douglas Gale, Standard Securities, in FINANCIAL INNOVATION 
AND RISK SHARING, supra note 49, at 309, 309. 
73. Klausner, supra note 49, at 785. 
74. Waibel, supra note 2, at 732 n.131 (“[S]overeign bonds with arbitration clauses . . . could 
implicitly recognize the possibility of eventual default and thereby negatively affect their 
marketability; the inclusion of arbitration clauses is therefore generally avoided, leaving domestic 
courts the forum of choice.”). 
75. See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 3, at 655–60 (discussing varied analytical approaches to 
understanding stickiness of default terms). 
76. In Westlaw and LexisNexis searches of the disclosure documents that some sovereign issuers 
file with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Professor Karen Halverson Cross found that only   
one of sixteen issuers—Brazil—used  arbitration, and also  noted the possibility that former Eastern-  
bloc issuers who are not European Union members (such as Ukraine) might use arbitration. See Cross, 
supra note 2, at 339–41 & n.22 (also citing prior study of thirteen issuers that found only Brazil using 
arbitration). 
77. See, e.g., Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 930 (“The parties involved are among the most 
sophisticated in the world financial markets.”). 
78. Cf. Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 55, at 119 (noting, in connection with choice of 
corporate form, that continued incorporation may evidence that some firms prefer that form). 
79. Standardization might “reflect maximization of positive interpretive network effects or . . . 
suboptimal tipping.” Lemley & McGowan, supra note 55, at 498. Likewise, variance might “reflect the 
optimal convergence of heterogeneous firms with heterogeneous governance provisions or . . . 
opportunity costs of not using a standard term.” Id. 
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make sense of the pattern, we need to assess both market participants’ likely 
preferences and whether their contracts appear to conflict with these 
preferences. Part II of this Article engages these questions, beginning with an 
assessment of the merits of arbitration as a means of resolving sovereign debt 
disputes. 
 
II. SOVEREIGN DEBT ARBITRATION: THEORY AND FACT 
 
A. Arbitration’s Uncertain Benefits 
For now, let us assume that the dispute resolution terms in sovereign bond 
contracts are indeed boilerplate—functionally identical—and that they eschew 
arbitration for litigation before courts in England or New York. There is nothing 
intrinsically puzzling about this state of affairs. The parties simply may prefer to 
resolve their disputes in court, or they may be sufficiently uncertain about the 
benefits of arbitration that they do not wish to experiment. Indeed, although 
arbitration clauses may be relatively common in some cross-border 
transactions,80 they appear infrequently in commercial lending contracts.81 The 
usual explanation for this is that commercial lending contracts involve relatively 
settled law that is predictably applied by creditor-friendly courts, often through 
summary procedures (unavailable in arbitration) that reduce enforcement 
costs.82 Add to this the fact that sovereign debt litigation involves vast sums of 
money, and it is perhaps to be expected that market participants will opt for the 
full procedural rights and appellate review available in court.83 
 
80. Stephen R. Bond, Commentary, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: 
COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 57, 59 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 
2005) (reporting that fifteen of seventeen (roughly eighty-eight percent) of international joint venture 
agreements studied included an arbitration clause). 
81. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An 
Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 
DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 350, 351 tbl.2 (2007) (finding low incidence of arbitration clauses in variety of 
commercial contracts filed with Securities and Exchange Commission, including lending contracts); 
William W. Park, Arbitration in Banking and Finance, 17 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 213, 215–16 (1998) 
(discussing low incidence of arbitration in lending contracts and citing, as one reason, that “default 
usually results from simple inability or unwillingness to pay, rather than any honest divergence in the 
interpretation of complex or ambiguous contract terms”). Arbitration clauses may be more common in 
consumer financial transactions. See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to 
Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62, 63 tbl.2 (2004) (finding arbitration clauses in eighteen of twenty-six (roughly 
sixty-nine percent) consumer financial contracts). Unlike  most  commercial  lending  arrangements,  
these are contracts in which the lender expects to engage in a high  volume  of  routine  collections 
activity and also incurs the risk of becoming a class action defendant. 
82. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic 
Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 231 (2000) (noting that courts have experience with (typically 
unambiguous) loan contracts and that arbitration may lessen deterrence benefits of litigation); Park,  
supra note 81, at 215–16 (stating financial institutions may find going to court easier than arbitration, 
particularly given “benefit of summary procedures for the enforcement of promissory notes and other 
commercial paper obligations”). 
83. In similar fashion, parties are thought to avoid arbitration in “bet the company” cases, “in 
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As noted previously, however, some have argued that issuers and 
bondholders should prefer arbitration to litigation in New York or England. For 
issuers, the advantage is the perceived neutrality of arbitration relative to the 
judges in these jurisdictions.84 For bondholders, the perceived advantage stems 
from the fact that arbitration awards may in some circumstances be easier to 
enforce than court judgments.85 Either of these benefits might induce parties to 
include arbitration clauses in sovereign bond contracts.86 For example, if 
arbitration awards were easier to enforce, even issuers that would prefer to 
litigate might accept arbitration if doing so reduced borrowing costs. This 
scenario would be most likely if bondholders believed that arbitration facilitated 
the orderly collection of defaulted debt and thus increased the cost of default to 
the issuer. Alternatively, even if bondholders believed arbitration to be an 
inferior enforcement forum—say because arbitrators are more likely to accept 
the sovereign’s arguments in default-related disputes—they might accept 
arbitration in exchange for higher returns. This latter scenario seems unlikely, as 
I presume that most issuers prefer to minimize borrowing costs.87 Nevertheless, 
the following discussion evaluates both the “neutrality” and “ease of 
enforcement” benefits claimed for arbitration. 
I do not argue that arbitration is an inappropriate forum for resolving 
sovereign debt disputes or deny that some market participants might have reason 
to prefer it to litigation in New York or England.88 But I do claim that its 
benefits are quite speculative and likely to be modest if they do exist. Thus, few 
participants in the sovereign debt markets are likely to prefer arbitration, and 
 
which an erroneous outcome could jeopardize the continued existence of the company.” Christopher 
R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 79 
(2008); see also ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE  ROLE  OF 
LAWYERS 603 (4th ed. 2006) (“[A] party for whom the stakes and risk of loss are high may for that 
reason become less interested in ‘informality’ – and more reluctant to  chance  a  decision  without  
having taken every possible advantage of the full panoply of legal procedures” available in court.). 
84. Both scholars and advocates have made this case. Professor Karen Halverson Cross has made 
the most thorough and forceful articulation of arbitration’s potential benefits. Cross, supra note 2, at 
354–65. For an argument that holders of defaulted Argentine bonds should invoke ICSID arbitration 
pursuant to arbitration provisions in bilateral investment treaties between Argentina and other 
countries, see Memorandum from Owen C. Pell to the Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders, 
supra note 56. 
85. Cross, supra note 2, at 356–65; Memorandum from Owen C. Pell to the Global Committee of 
Argentina Bondholders, supra note 56; see also Park, supra note 11, at 217–20 (discussing potential 
enforcement advantages of arbitration). 
86. For a model of the choice between arbitration and litigation, see Christopher R. Drahozal, 
Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical Look at the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 523, 531–32 (2005). Drahozal explains that parties will choose arbitration if the marginal benefit   
of arbitration exceeds its marginal cost and, in cases where arbitration benefits only one party, that    
party makes a transfer payment to induce the other party’s assent. Id. 
87. The widespread use of choice of forum terms calling for litigation in New York or England is 
consistent with this assumption. Issuers could, of course, attempt to negotiate more favorable choice of 
forum terms, and at least some do. See infra notes 148–49 and accompanying text for examples of 
issuers who have adopted more favorable choice of forum terms than what is standard. 
88. See generally Park, supra note 11 (providing additional analysis of arbitration’s role in cross- 
border lending transactions). 
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fewer still are likely to prefer it strongly enough to expend negotiating capital in 
pursuit of an arbitration clause.89 
 
1. The Questionable Case for Neutrality 
Consider first the notion that arbitrators are “neutral”—free of political and 
other bias90—and therefore should be more agreeable to sovereign borrowers. 
This notion runs counter to a great deal of historical skepticism about arbitration 
among developing nations in particular.91 The “neutrality” argument, however, 
suggests that this skepticism may be misplaced. Yet the term “neutrality” is 
worth unpacking, because it is potentially misleading in the context of 
arbitration. 
Begin by distinguishing two separate concepts related to “neutrality”: the 
concept of competitive constraint and the concept of bias. Arbitrators are 
competitively constrained because they must be selected by both parties, typically 
after a dispute arises, from a pool of competing arbitrators. This means that if 
sovereign borrowers and their creditors have sufficient access to information 
about arbitrators’ prior awards—a debatable assumption in many contexts, but 
not unreasonable here—each will prefer to avoid arbitrators whose awards are 
unfavorable relative to those of others in the pool.92 In such a case, we might 
characterize the awards of successful arbitrators as statistically exchangeable: 
“[T]he strategy of a successful (i.e., enduring) arbitrator is to provide decisions 
that are forecasts of the decisions other arbitrators will make in similar 
situations.”93 The point is straightforward: arbitrators will not get much business 






89. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 55, at 588 (making a similar point with regard to 
financial contracts generally). 
90. Cross, supra note 2, at 355. 
91. See infra notes 100, 104–05 and accompanying text for a discussion of skepticism regarding 
neutrality of arbitrators. 
92. At present, because of the relatively small number of investment treaty arbitrations, 
especially in the context of sovereign debt instruments, there will be relatively few prior awards to 
consider. This may increase the uncertainty inherent in the process of arbitrator selection. Over time 
this would change, but in the short term parties (perhaps especially creditors) may prefer a forum they 
perceive to offer more certainty. 
93. Orley Ashenfelter, Arbitration and the Negotiation Process, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 342, 343 
(1987). 
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similar cases.94 This notion of competitive constraint is a component of arbitrator 
“neutrality.”95 
Importantly, the fact that arbitrators are subject to competitive constraint 
does not mean that they are unbiased. Nothing prevents the parties from 
agreeing to arbitrate before a pool of arbitrators whose awards tend towards bias 
in one party’s favor. To see the point, consider the familiar example of a contract 
between a business and a consumer—say, a ticket for a cruise in the Pacific— 
which includes a choice of forum clause selecting Florida state courts.96 Assume 
that Florida state judges are generally sympathetic to the cruise industry. In a 
sense, the forum is “biased” against consumers; certainly it is less favorable than 
alternatives.97 The bias would not disappear if Florida procedural rules allowed 
litigants to strike unfavorable judges. No doubt the parties would steer clear of 
the most (and least) biased judges, but that would not ensure “neutrality.” 
The process of arbitrator selection involves a similar dynamic, most 
obviously when the parties choose the arbitrator or arbitrators from a list 
provided by an administering institution, such as the American Arbitration 
Association, designated in the contract. In this “list” process, the parties strike 
unfavorable arbitrators from the list, rank the rest according to preference, and 
the administering institution appoints the most highly ranked arbitrator or 
arbitrators acceptable to both parties.98 This process allows each party to 
eliminate unfavorable arbitrators but not to ensure the appointment of any one 
in particular. And, of course, their choices are constrained by the arbitrators on 
the roster maintained by the administering institution. In international disputes 
featuring three-arbitrator panels, it is more common for each party to appoint an 
arbitrator and for the two party-appointed arbitrators, or some neutral 
appointing authority, to appoint the third.99 Nevertheless, the choice of 
 
94. This is not to say that such distributional concerns are the only considerations that shape 
arbitrator selection decisions. For example, considerations often grouped loosely under the heading of 
procedural justice—perceptions that the process is fair and that  participants are  treated  with  respect, 
and other process and interactional concerns—may also shape the parties’ choices. See generally 
Richard A. Posthuma et al., Arbitrator Acceptability: Does Justice Matter?, 39 INDUS. REL. 313 (2000); 
Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 211 (2004). 
95. Cross, supra note 2, at 370 (stating that arbitrators have incentives to render decisions that 
are “responsive to the interests of the parties” because their “reputation and prospects for future work 
hinge on their satisfaction”). 
96. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587–88 (1991). 
97. Consumers might have to pay a higher price for these alternatives. This point emphasizes that 
dispute resolution terms impact the overall allocation of risks and rewards in the transaction. Choice 
of a borrower-friendly forum may prompt the lender to demand concessions elsewhere in the 
agreement. In the sovereign debt context, if arbitrators are less “biased”—i.e., more likely to accept 
the sovereign issuer’s arguments in default-related litigation—bondholders might demand higher 
returns if they perceive this to increase the risk of default. 
98. See, e.g., United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration 
Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 6 (Apr. 28, 1976) (establishing default appointment process for single- 
arbitrator cases); COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES R-11 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n 2009) 
(establishing process for selection of arbitrators after parties have conferred). 
99. E.g., UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 98, art. 7. This is the default method for 
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arbitrator, and especially the choice of the third, “presiding” arbitrator, remains 
effectively constrained by the pool of arbitrators deemed suitable for 
international arbitration, and this is an elite group hailing primarily, though not 
exclusively, from Western countries.100 
What does this mean for sovereign debt arbitration? Arbitrators may be 
“neutral” in the sense of being competitively constrained. Thus, in addition to 
appointing one of the three arbitrators, each  party  can  be  reasonably  assured  
that the third, presiding arbitrator will not fall too far outside the mainstream.101 
Sovereign issuers, therefore, may well prefer this aspect of arbitration to the 
“standard” dispute resolution provision calling for litigation in New York or 
England; at least in arbitration they can participate in selecting the decision 
maker.102 But this does not necessarily mean that the overall pool of arbitrators 
will be unbiased, or that arbitrators will produce substantially “better” results, 
from the perspective of sovereign borrowers, than the judges who preside over 
these national courts. 
I do not assert that arbitration—before ICSID panels or otherwise—is in 
fact biased in favor of foreign investors.103 But it is clear that many governments 
 
appointing arbitrators under ICSID. See Convention on the Settlement  of  Investment  Disputes  
Between States and Nationals of Other States art. 37(2)(b), opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 
U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 160; ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration 
Rules), Rule 3 (Apr. 10, 2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp 
(follow “English PDF” hyperlink). 
100. See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL  ORDER  93–97 
(1996) (discussing development and limits of market in “third-world legal expertise” and noting that 
arbitrators from third-world countries are rarely appointed president  of  arbitral  tribunal);  John  
Beechey, International Commercial Arbitration: A Process Under Review and Change, DISP. RESOL. J., 
Aug.–Oct. 2000, at 32, 33 (finding many arbitrator appointments continue to come from small group of 
English-speaking lawyers from Western countries with known track record); Susan D. Franck, 
Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 78–79 (2007) 
(reporting that seventy-five percent of arbitrators in her sample came from Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development countries); Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the International 
Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 957, 965–70 (2005) (discussing developments in market for 
international arbitrator services, including likelihood that arbitrators will favor appointment of other 
“members” of the “club”). 
101. As noted in the text, it is common in international arbitrations for each party to appoint an 
arbitrator of its choosing, and neither can block the other’s appointment except in unusual cases. 
Nevertheless, the parties do have some control over the selection of the presiding arbitrator. If the 
presiding arbitrator is to be selected by agreement, each party may control the selection directly by 
rejecting arbitrators it deems unacceptable. If the presiding arbitrator is to be selected by the party- 
appointed arbitrators or by some neutral appointing authority, the parties influence the selection less 
directly. Yet few party-appointed arbitrators or appointing institutions will knowingly appoint as 
president an arbitrator whose past decisions can be viewed as aberrant. 
102. In this sense, the likely issuer preference for arbitration invokes the distinction between 
independent and dependent international tribunals, with the former characterized by greater 
institutional separation from the state parties involved. See Posner & Yoo, supra note 59, at 7–8 
(noting that conventional wisdom favors independence for international tribunals). There is some 
theoretical and empirical support for the view that dependent tribunals, over which state parties have 
greater control, are more successful. Id. 
103. One study reveals no obvious pro-investor bias at ICSID, although the study does not 
2009] DISPUTING BOILERPLATE 19 
and advocacy groups claim that it is biased.104 To an extent, these claims may 
simply be an effort to exert leverage and to shape arbitrators’ behavior, but they 
also reflect skepticism about investment arbitration among developing countries 
in particular.105 And, as the foregoing discussion suggests, this skepticism is not 
inconsistent with the fact that arbitrators operate in a competitive marketplace, 
nor with the fact that arbitrators are less susceptible to political pressures than 
judges. Indeed, the fact that competitive constraint does not ensure lack of bias 
can be demonstrated empirically, even in arbitration systems created by parties 
with relatively equal negotiating leverage and information. For example, there is 
some evidence of pro-team bias in Major League Baseball arbitration, a system 
populated by sophisticated and well-informed repeat players.106 Thus, it is at 
least open to question whether sovereign borrowers, especially emerging market 
countries, should strongly prefer existing arbitration systems even to courts in 
New York and London.107 
Another facet of arbitration bears mention: It is financed by the parties 
themselves. National courts are heavily subsidized by taxpayers, but arbitration 
tribunals must be paid by the parties, and these costs may be shifted to the losing 
party. There is no reliable evidence of the costs of ICSID arbitration, but the 
costs may be substantial. One study found that tribunal costs alone (primarily 
 
 
permit any assessment of the merits of the claims adjudicated or any comparison to the results that 
might be expected in litigation. Franck, supra note 100, at 83–85. 
104. E.g., Beechey, supra note 100, at 32, 33 (noting skepticism among developing nations about 
international arbitration); Letter from Food & Water Watch, USA et al., to Ana Palacio, Sec’y Gen. of 
ICSID (June 21, 2007), available at http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/water/world-water/right/icsid- 
letter (stating, in letter sent on behalf of 134 organizations supporting Bolivia’s decision to withdraw 
from ICSID, “ICSID represents the inequities of an international system biased against the developing 
countries”); Emad Mekay, Bias Seen in Int’l Dispute Arbiters, INTER PRESS SERV., June 19, 2004, 
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=38229 (noting that while most ICSID cases are against 
developing nations, most arbitrators “hail from industrialized countries”). 
105. For an overview of historic (but diminished) skepticism about arbitration, see generally Amr 
A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias Under the Specter of 
Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419 (2000). See also Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival of the “Have-
Nots” in International Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 341, 356–60 (2007) (exploring reasons for state resistance 
to international investment arbitration). 
106. See generally John D. Burger & Stephen J.K. Walters, Arbitrator Bias and Self-Interest: 
Lessons from the Baseball Labor Market, 26 J. LAB. RES. 267 (2005). 
107. It bears repeating that if arbitrators are more likely to produce “issuer-friendly” decisions, 
bondholders might demand a premium for holding bonds that introduced such uncertainty into 
enforcement proceedings. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text for a discussion of related  
costs and benefits. None of the arguments for the use of sovereign debt arbitration, however, suggest   
that issuers would be willing to make such a transfer payment. Thus, another component  of  the  
arbitrator “neutrality” argument suggests that issuers might find it “less of an intrusion on [their] 
sovereignty” to submit a dispute to an independent arbitrator than to  submit  to  the  jurisdiction  of 
courts in New York or England. Cross, supra note 2, at 355. Some issuers indeed may perceive 
arbitration to offer this benefit. Cf. Harvey D. Shapiro, The Sovereign Borrowing Battle: Who Has 
Jurisdiction if a Government Is Sued?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1977, at 56 (discussing 
borrowers’ resistance to foreign court jurisdiction). But it is hardly clear that this will be a common 
perception. Nor is it clear that issuers would value this benefit so highly that they would accept higher 
disputing costs or higher borrowing costs to obtain it. 
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arbitrator fees) averaged almost $600,000 per ICSID case and that governments 
paid slightly over half that amount.108 These figures do not include legal fees and 
other litigation costs, which may dwarf costs associated with the tribunal itself.109 
To be sure, these costs may be modest compared to the aggregate claims 
asserted against defaulting issuers. But they are not trivial.110 Indeed, it is 
entirely possible that aggregate disputing costs would be substantially greater in 
arbitration. If that is so, we should not be surprised if sovereign borrowers and 
their creditors prefer to have taxpayers subsidize their disputes. 
 
2. Are Arbitration Awards Easier to Enforce? 
Despite these concerns, issuers might consent to arbitration if doing so 
reduced borrowing costs. If arbitration facilitated the collection of defaulted 
debt, bondholders might prefer it to litigation and accept lower returns from 
bonds that included arbitration clauses.111 Indeed, an issuer might agree to 
arbitration to signal its low likelihood of default. But there are reasons to doubt 
arbitration’s enforcement benefits. One such reason is the possibility that 
arbitrators will less rigorously enforce loan obligations, thus reducing the 
deterrent effect of enforcement proceedings.112 This possibility is often invoked 
to explain why commercial loan agreements rarely include arbitration clauses.113 
This section offers two additional reasons for doubting arbitration’s enforcement 
benefits in the sovereign debt context. First, it is unlikely that the incremental 
international pressure associated with unpaid arbitration awards would prompt 
voluntary payment. Second, bond contracts that provide for litigation may obtain 
some of the enforcement benefits claimed for arbitration by including broad 
waivers of sovereign immunity. Such a practice would capture some of 
arbitration’s potential benefits without incurring any of the associated costs and 
uncertainty. 
Begin with the prospect of voluntary payment. Creditors historically have 
had little ability to enforce sovereign debt obligations in the issuer’s courts, and 
sovereign borrowers may not keep substantial assets in jurisdictions with relaxed 
approaches to sovereign immunity.114 Thus, the coercive mechanisms available 
to secure payment when corporate borrowers fail to pay are of limited use in the 
sovereign debt context. But perhaps arbitration awards are more likely than 
 
108. See Franck, supra note 100, at 68–69 (reporting results from only seventeen cases). 
109. In addition to the parties’ own litigation costs, the tribunal may require the losing party to 
pay some or all of the other party’s litigation costs. See id. at 69–70 (reporting results from small 
subsample of ICSID awards and noting that, in five cost-shifting cases in which award contained 
relevant information, sovereign contributed average of $927,635 to investor’s legal costs). 
110. The costs cited above are per-dispute costs, not an estimate of the total cost of resolving all 
claims arising out of a default. 
111. If arbitration is inferior from an enforcement perspective, bondholders would presumably 
view arbitration clauses negatively and perhaps demand higher returns for holding such securities. 
112. Hylton, supra note 82, at 231. 
113. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the infrequency with which 
commercial lending contracts include arbitration clauses. 
114. Bratton & Gulati, supra note 10, at 11–13. 
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court judgments to induce voluntary payment. Unlike failure to pay a court 
judgment, failure to pay an award issued by an ICSID tribunal violates an 
international treaty.115 Moreover, the World Bank, with which ICSID is closely 
associated, would prefer not to see ICSID awards routinely go unpaid and might 
pressure sovereigns to pay awards, perhaps threatening to deny future lending.116 
These additional pressures might lead to voluntary payment.117 
While not completely implausible, this suggestion is hardly self-evident.118 It 
seems equally if not more likely that any additional pressure associated with an 
ICSID award would be of modest significance. “Unlike corporate borrowers, 
sovereigns do not necessarily default because they cannot pay.”119 Default may 
already impose significant costs on the issuer, generating international pressure 
and limiting its future access to credit markets.120 Nevertheless, the issuer may 
default if these costs are outweighed by the political and economic costs of 
servicing its existing (largely foreign-owned) debt.121 Whatever the reason, 
default is typically followed by efforts to restructure the outstanding debt, efforts 
whose success depends at least in part on obtaining bondholders’ consent to the 
restructuring.122 Thus, the issuer will presumably be disinclined to pay awards 
voluntarily, lest it encourage creditors to hold out and potentially disrupt its 
restructuring efforts. In this context, it seems unlikely that any incremental cost 
of international pressure due to unpaid arbitration awards (over and above the 
cost to the issuer of ignoring court judgments) will induce payment. Such cases 
might exist, but it is hard to believe they will be common. 
 
 
115. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, supra note 99, art. 53; CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A 
COMMENTARY 1088–90 (2001). 
116. Cross, supra note 2, at 363. 
117. Id. at 362–63; see also Memorandum from Owen C. Pell to the Global Committee of 
Argentina Bondholders, supra note 56 (stating experience shows that nations pay ICSID awards). 
There is some, albeit mixed, empirical evidence suggesting higher rates of state compliance with the 
judgments of “dependent” tribunals like arbitration. See Posner & Yoo, supra note 59, at 38, 48 
(finding increased compliance in cases where jurisdiction of International Court of Justice is more 
closely tied to party consent; also finding roughly equivalent compliance with GATT and WTO 
adjudication mechanisms). For a discussion of problems in measuring compliance rates, see id. at 28. 
118. Although there is a high reported rate of compliance with ICSID awards, Peter Griffin & 
Ania Farren, How ICSID Can Protect Sovereign Bondholders, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 2005, at 21, 24, 
the awards issued to date tend to involve amounts that may pale in comparison to the stakes of 
sovereign debt litigation, Franck, supra note 100, at 55–64. 
119. Bratton & Gulati, supra note 10, at 12. 
120. Jonathan Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, Sovereign Debt 8–16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 5131, May 1995). 
121. Bratton & Gulati, supra note 10, at 12; see also Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 5, at 1632–38 
(discussing growth of domestic debt in emerging markets). Not all defaults are strategic in this sense. 
Default may be essentially involuntary in cases of significant economic distress or illiquidity. Yet for 
these involuntary defaults, it seems doubtful that increased international pressure will lead to 
substantial rates of voluntary payment. Presumably, the debtor is willing to pay, but financial exigency 
limits its ability to do so. 
122. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 10, at 18–23 (discussing sovereign debt restructuring and 
need for creditor consent). 
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Nor is it obvious that arbitration awards, even those issued by ICSID 
panels, facilitate coercive debt collection. To be sure, under U.S. law foreign 
states enjoy a more limited immunity from attachment and execution for 
judgments based on arbitral awards.123 This is because the FSIA permits 
successful arbitration claimants to execute upon property of a foreign state “used 
for a commercial activity in the United States.”124 Successful court litigants, by 
contrast, may execute upon such property only if the property also “is or was 
used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based.”125 But this 
benefit is largely illusory, for U.S. law also permits contractual waivers of 
sovereign immunity.126 Thus, the issuer can confer this enforcement benefit 
simply by agreeing to waive its immunity from execution. As it turns out, the 
substantial majority of bond contracts in my sample contain such a waiver.127 
The foregoing discussion has not exhausted arbitration’s potential 
enforcement advantages. International treaties, including the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, require contracting 
states to enforce arbitral awards with limited or no review of the merits of the 
arbitration panel’s decision.128 Few such treaties require recognition and 
enforcement of foreign court judgments.129 So it is conceivable that arbitration 
awards might be easier to enforce than court judgments in the issuer’s own 
courts.130 Yet in the context of default on hundreds of millions or billions of 
dollars of national debt, it is unclear why these treaties would make much 
difference. Perhaps the most fundamental problem is that the issuer’s courts will 
lack the willingness or political capital necessary to induce the unwilling 
sovereign to pay. Court judgments are not self-executing, so these courts can not 
compel payment even if they wished to do so. And while issuers may incur 




123. Compare Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976  §  4(a),  28  U.S.C.  §  1610(a)(2)  (2006) 
(no sovereign immunity from execution for property of foreign  state  used  for  commercial  activity  in  
United States “if . . . the property is or was used [in connection with] . . . the commercial activity upon 
which the claim is based” (emphasis added)), with id. § 1610(a)(6) (no sovereign immunity  from  
execution for property of foreign state used for  commercial  activity  in  United  States  if  judgment  “is  
based on an order confirming an arbitral award”). 
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(6). 
125. Id. § 1610(a)(2). 
126. Id. § 1610(a)(1). 
127. See infra notes 190–202 and accompanying text for a discussion of bond contracts containing 
a waiver of immunity. 
128. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 
69, art. IV. For discussion of this treaty, which is often referred to as the New York Convention, and 
other relevant treaties, see Park, supra note 81, at 219. 
129. See Park, supra note 81, at 218 (noting some countries may enforce foreign judgments out of 
desire for “comity,” but “not all legal systems will be so generous” (citations omitted)). 
130. Because most of the issuer’s assets will be located within its jurisdiction, bondholders may 
need to seek enforcement through these courts. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 10, at 11 (stating 
“sovereign obligations cannot be directly enforced in the sovereign obligator’s own courts” and that 
defaulting sovereigns rarely leave assets in countries with lowered sovereign immunity barriers). 
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costs may not be very high.131 This fundamental dynamic persists even when the 
issuer’s courts have the authority or duty to enforce an arbitration award.132 And 
even if other jurisdictions exist in which foreign arbitration awards are 
enforceable, but foreign court judgments are not, these jurisdictions do not 
matter unless the issuer keeps substantial assets in them and the assets are 
subject to execution under the enforcing jurisdiction’s law.133 
None of this is to say that arbitration, before ICSID or any other 
international arbitration tribunal, is inherently inferior for resolving sovereign 
debt disputes. But its advantages are unclear, to say the least. Perhaps the most 
we can say is that there is no justifiable consensus as to the best forum for 
resolving sovereign debt disputes.134 Indeed, it may be that market actors have 
given little thought to the question. Some evidence of this comes from the 
behavior of public sector officials, who have devoted substantial attention to 
identifying optimal contract terms for sovereign borrowing but have largely 
ignored questions about the proper disputing forum.135 The important point, 
however, is that arbitration’s benefits are not so apparent that many participants 
in the sovereign debt markets are likely to favor it. And given the rather 





131. See Eric A. Posner, Book Review, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 509, 511 (2007) (reviewing ROBERT E. 
SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY AND THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006)) (noting potentially limited reputational costs of 
ignoring national court judgments). 
132. Cf. Cross, supra note 2, at 361 (acknowledging that this enforcement benefit may be only 
“theoretical”). 
133. There are currently 143 ICSID Contracting States, each of which is obliged to “recognize an 
award . . . as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories 
as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.” Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, supra note 99, art. 54(1). But ICSID does not 
displace background law conferring immunity from execution on the sovereign’s assets. See id. art. 55 
(specifying that “Article 54 shall not be construed as derogating from the law in force . . . relating to 
immunity”). Thus, even “a final judgment of a court” in a jurisdiction in which the issuer keeps 
substantial assets may be effectively unenforceable. Broad immunity waivers do not necessarily solve 
this problem (even in jurisdictions that recognize them), because many sovereign assets will be exempt 
from execution notwithstanding the waiver. See infra notes 196–99 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the effects of immunity waivers. 
134. So much is clear from extant debates over the merits of U.S. class action practice. Compare 
Whitney Debevoise & David Orta, The Class Action Threat to Sovereign Workouts, INT’L FIN. L. REV., 
July 2003, at 41, 44 (rejecting efficacy of class actions as response to sovereign debt in favor of 
negotiated restructuring), with David Skeel, Why the Class Action Strategy Is Worth a Second Look, 
INT’L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 2003, at 23, 24 (arguing that, under current conditions, “there may be a role    
for the class action mechanism to play”). 
135. E.g., GROUP OF TEN, REPORT  OF  THE G-10 WORKING GROUP  ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES 2–
5 (2002), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf (proposing model contract terms for 
appointment of trustee or bondholder representative,  majority  action  clauses,  majority  enforcement 
and acceleration clauses, etc., without addressing disputing forum); see also Ahdieh, supra note 18, at 
736–40 (discussing role of regulatory cues provided by public actors in spurring innovation). 
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B. Evaluating Enforcement-Related Contracting Practices 
The discussion thus far has taken for granted that sovereign bonds indeed 
adopt boilerplate terms calling for litigation in New York or London, arguing 
that there is no need to invoke network theory, or any other theory of contract 
“stickiness,” to explain such a pattern. To the contrary, there is no reason to 
presume that issuers or bondholders would be significantly better off choosing 
arbitration. This section turns to the contracts themselves, asking whether the 
assumption of standardization matches the empirical reality. 
1. Description of the Contracts 
There is little empirical evidence on the use of arbitration in sovereign debt 
contracts, and even less that would help explain why parties choose particular 
enforcement-related terms. In a search of disclosure documents filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), Professor Karen Halverson 
Cross found that only Brazilian bonds provided for arbitration.136 SEC filings, 
however, cover only a portion of the sovereign debt market. In an effort to 
develop a more robust picture of actual contracting practices, I randomly 
selected and coded disclosure documents—offering circulars in the private 
offering context, and prospectuses and prospectus supplements in the registered 
offering context—gathered both from SEC filings and from the Thomson 
Financial database.137 These disclosure documents contain detailed descriptions 
of the terms of the underlying bond contracts.138 
The dataset includes a total of 111 bond issuances between 1991 and 2008. 
Most (96 out of 111) were issued between 1999 and 2007. New York or English 
law governs 105 of the issuances. Because these two “standards” are of primary 
interest, I have excluded the remaining six from the tables and figures reported 
below.139 As Table 1 indicates, the resulting dataset includes 46 English-law  
bonds, all of which are private issuances, and 59 New York-law bonds, of which 
31 (52.5%) are private issuances and 28 (47.5%) are registered offerings. 
 
 
136. Cross, supra note 2, at 340. Professor Cross also noted that some issuers located in the 
former Eastern bloc were reputed to offer arbitration as an alternative to litigation. Id. at 340 & n.22 
(citing Ukraine as example). 
137. I thank Mitu Gulati for providing me with access to many of these disclosure documents. 
138. Sovereign bond documentation includes a contract between the issuer and its investment 
bankers, a disclosure statement, and contracts, “including the debt instrument itself, that govern the 
relationship between the sovereign debtor and its bondholders.” Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 5, at 
1636. The issuer, its investment bankers, and their respective lawyers negotiate the “key contracts.” Id. 
at 1637. Investors generally review only the disclosure statement, which describes key bond terms in 
detail. See id. at 1637 n.43 (stating that, of the investors they interviewed, none reported reading 
contract). For a general discussion of U.S. disclosure rules in the sovereign borrowing context, see 
generally Lee C. Buchheit, The Schedule B Alternative, INT’L FIN. L. REV., July 1992, at 6, 6; Stephen 
J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, An Empirical Study of Securities Disclosure Practices, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1023, 
1034–43 (2005–2006). 
139. These include two Canadian-law issuances by the Province of Manitoba, issuances governed 
by French law by Morocco and Portugal, and German-law issuances by Argentina and Venezuela. 
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Table 1. New York- and English-law bonds, by manner of issuance 
 
 Registered/Private 
Private Registered Total 









77 28 105 
 
I coded each issuance for a variety of enforcement-related terms, including 
approaches to sovereign immunity, choice of forum, use of arbitration, and 
governing law. The resulting dataset offers the most comprehensive empirical 
picture currently available of enforcement-related contracting practices in 
sovereign debt transactions. SEC disclosures, for example, cover only bonds 
publicly issued in U.S. markets, while this dataset allows an evaluation of 
contracting practices in both public and private markets and with respect to 
bonds governed by both New York and English law. Furthermore, the sample 
includes at least one issuance from virtually every major issuer of New York or 
English law bonds over a period of nearly twenty years. 
As I have mentioned, actual contracting practices are difficult to 
interpret.140 Assume, for example, that sovereign bonds uniformly eschew 
arbitration for litigation. It may be impossible to identify the precise extent to 
which such uniformity reflects the stickiness of the litigation default term, as 
opposed to a widespread preference for litigation or some other cause.141 In 
evaluating the data, however, I was particularly interested in contracting 
practices that seemed inconsistent with any strong version of the stickiness story. 
For example, variance in how different issuers structure the dispute resolution 
process suggests that it may be easy to overstate the benefits that accrue from 
widespread use of a particular dispute resolution term. In addition, a particular 
kind of uniformity—widespread use of contract terms waiving the issuer’s 
immunity from execution—would suggest an alternative explanation: Bonds that 
include such clauses provide one of the primary enforcement benefits claimed 
for arbitration142 without incurring any of the associated risks.143 
I report several principal findings: 
• First, across different issuers, bond contracts are not as standardized 
 
140. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulty  in  
interpreting actual contracting practices. 
141. Cf. Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 55, at 119 (“If the corporate form is advantageous for 
some firms, the fact that firms are continuing to incorporate fails to indicate the presence of network 
externalities.”). 
142. See supra notes 123–27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the enforcement benefits 
of arbitration in light of bonds waiving the issuer’s immunity. See Cross, supra note 2, at 359 (noting 
that immunity waivers may convey similar enforcement benefits but  that  not  all  sovereigns  might 
agree to such waiver). 
143. See supra notes 80–135 and accompanying text for a discussion of the absence of associated 
risks for bonds with immunity waivers. 
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as is often supposed. With respect to choice of forum terms, this 
variance includes, but is not limited to, a small minority of issuers 
whose bonds permit investors to arbitrate. 
• Second, issuers that agree to arbitration appear to have  varied 
reasons for doing so. Some are barred by domestic law from 
submitting to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. Others include 
arbitration in a menu of disputing forums available at the investor’s 
election. In most cases, however, the use of arbitration arguably is 
driven by doubt as to the availability or efficacy of litigation in  
foreign courts. 
• Third, similarly situated issuers sometimes make different 
contracting choices. For example, arbitration clauses are common 
but not standard in bonds issued by former Soviet republics that are 
relatively new entrants to the sovereign debt markets. 
• Fourth, there is additional variance in sovereign immunity terms. 
But a sizeable majority of the issuers (around eighty-five percent) 
broadly waive their sovereign immunity from execution. The 
widespread use of such immunity terms weakens the case for 
arbitration’s superior enforceability. 
• Finally, issuers with established dispute resolution terms rarely 
change their contracting practices. Thus, despite the variance across 
issuers, there is limited within-issuer variance. 
The following sections discuss these findings. Part III discusses their 
implications for sovereign debt arbitration and for research into contract 
innovation and change. 
 
2. Variance Across Issuers: Choice of Forum and Arbitration 
Unless otherwise noted, I report enforcement-related contracting practices 
by issuer, reporting separate results for bonds issued under New York and 
English law. That is, the figures reported below do not include multiple, same- 
law bond issuances by the same issuer.144 However, in the few cases where I have 
both New York- and English-law bonds by a particular issuer, I report separate 
results for both sets of bonds.145 Beginning with choice of forum terms, the 
disclosure documents reveal a perhaps surprising diversity of approaches. As 
Table 2 indicates, most issuers submit to the jurisdiction of a single external 
forum—courts in England (for English-law bonds) or New York (for New York- 
law bonds)—and thus conform to one of the two perceived choice of forum 
 
 
144. As I discuss below, see infra notes 204–06 and accompanying text, it appears that issuers 
rarely change established contracting practices. Thus, excluding multiple issuances by the same issuer 
avoids some double-counting without reducing the apparent diversity of contracting practices. 
145. Only Poland, Kazakhstan, and the Philippines fall into this category. I report separate 
results for the New York- and English-law bonds of these issuers because bonds are generally 
considered to be standardized within (but not necessarily across) these two markets. See Ahdieh, supra 
note 18, at 726 (noting New York and English debt markets are internally standardized but distinct 
from each other). 
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standards.146 But even a cursory glance at Table 2 reveals that  the  choice  of 
forum “standard” is not so standard after all. Indeed, over 20% of the issuers 
depart in some way from the standard.147 
 
Table 2. Summary of choice of forum terms 
 
 
Choice of forum 
Issuers 
N % of Total 
Cumulative 
% 
No external forum No submission to jurisdiction 







External forum Arbitration only 2 2.8% 6.9% 
 Arbitration + foreign courts 5 6.9% 13.9% 
 Multiple foreign courts 5 6.9% 20.8% 
 One foreign court 57 79.2% 100.0% 
  72  
 
One issuer (Russia) does not submit to any jurisdiction, even that of its own 
courts.148 Two others (Australia and the Province of Nova Scotia) do not submit 
to the jurisdiction of any foreign court or tribunal but do agree that bondholders 
may sue in the borrower’s domestic courts.149 The remaining issuers submit to 
the jurisdiction of some external forum, but often in ways that depart from the 
choice of forum standard. Five issuers (6.9%) submit to the jurisdiction of both 





146. Again, this does not mean that bondholders may only sue in these courts. In many cases, the 
issuer also consents to be sued in its own courts. Moreover, the issuer may be amenable to suit in   
foreign courts even if it has not agreed to be sued there, but if the issuer has not waived its immunity  
from suit the bondholder would have to invoke exceptions to sovereign immunity under the law of    
those jurisdictions. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text for a discussion of exceptions to 
sovereign immunity. 
147. The first five rows in Table 2 represent some departure from the choice of forum 
“standards.” 
148. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, OFFERING CIRCULAR 90 (June 10, 1998) (offering 11.75% 
Bonds due in 2003 and specifying that “Issuer has not submitted to the jurisdiction of any court, 
agreed that disputes may be resolved in any forum or appointed any agent for service of process”) 
[hereinafter THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 1998 OFFERING CIRCULAR]; THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 
OFFERING CIRCULAR 85–86 (June 26, 1997) (offering 10% Bonds due in 2007) [hereinafter THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 1997 OFFERING CIRCULAR]. 
149. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER 
SCHEDULE B OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, at 9–10 (June 5, 1995); PROVINCE OF NOVA SCOTIA 
(CAN.), PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (TO PROSPECTUS DATED JUNE 6, 2002) 5 (Jan. 18, 2007). 
150. Two of these are New York-law bonds (Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago) and three are 
English-law bonds (Oman, Moldova, Barbados). 
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As it turns out, the prevailing view that sovereign bond contracts eschew 
the use of arbitration is correct, but only to a point.151 Bonds issued by seven of 
the seventy-two issuers (9.7%) expressly permit bondholders to bring claims in 
arbitration: Brazil, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Poland, the Slovak Republic, 
and Ukraine.152 As Table 3 indicates, five of these are English-law bonds (all 
private issuances) and two are New York-law bonds (one a private issuance and 
one registered).153 
 




English New York Total 
Private Arbitration No 26 21 47 
  Yes 5 1 6 
Registered Arbitration No 0 18 18 
  Yes 0 1 1 
  Total 31 41 72 
 
Although only a minority of issuers use arbitration, Table 4 below reveals 
some interesting differences in how and why they use it. National law in both 
Brazil and El Salvador forbids each country to submit to the jurisdiction  of  
foreign courts.154 The New York-law bonds issued by these countries 
contemplate only arbitration in New York or litigation  in  the  borrower’s 
domestic courts. Each, therefore, represents a significant departure from the 
 
151. See Cross, supra note 2, at 377 (referring to “persistent absence” of arbitration from  
sovereign bond contracts); Waibel, supra note 2, at 732 (discussing lack of arbitration clauses in 
sovereign bonds). 
152. I say “expressly permit,” because including an arbitration clause in the bond contract is not 
the only way sovereign issuers may consent to arbitration. Many bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) 
contain provisions allowing foreign investors to submit investment-related disputes to arbitration, 
often before ICSID. See, e.g., Memorandum from Owen C. Pell to the Global Committee of Argentina 
Bondholders, supra note 56 (stating one benefit of ICSID is that while U.S. judgments are not 
automatically respected outside the U.S., Argentina is obligated to honor ICSID awards). For 
example, relying on a provision in the Italy-Argentina BIT, Italian bondholders have instituted ICSID 
arbitration proceedings against Argentina. See Alemanni v. Argentine Rep., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/8 (registered Mar. 27, 2007); Beccara v. Argentine Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5 
(registered Feb. 7, 2007). 
153. In one case (Poland), five of the seven English-law bonds in the sample include an 
arbitration clause, and two do not. In all other cases where I have multiple issuances of same-law 
bonds (Brazil (2); El Salvador (8); Slovakia (2); Ukraine (4)), all bonds in the sample contain an 
arbitration clause. 
154. See, e.g., FEDERATIVE REP. OF BRAZ., FINAL PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (TO PROSPECTUS 
DATED MAY 8, 2007) 13 (Jan. 6, 2009) (“Brazil is prohibited from submitting to the jurisdiction of a 
foreign court for the purposes of adjudication on the merits.”); THE REP. OF EL SAL., OFFERING 
CIRCULAR v (Oct. 17, 2002) (offering 7.75% Notes due in 2023 and stating that “[u]nder its 
Constitution, the Republic is not permitted to consent to jurisdiction of the courts of any foreign 
jurisdiction”). 
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standard. The arbitration clause effectively substitutes for foreign court 
litigation, perhaps as a concession to investors reluctant to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the issuer’s domestic courts. And in each case, domestic law 
prevents the issuer from agreeing to the “standard” term. 
By contrast, bonds issued by Georgia, Estonia, Poland, the Slovak Republic, 
and Ukraine (all governed by English law) supplement the standard dispute 
resolution term with an additional forum choice, arbitration, to be invoked at the 
bondholder’s discretion. Consider a sample clause as described in the offering 
circular to a 2002 issuance by the Republic of Estonia: 
(2) Jurisdiction of English Courts 
The Issuer irrevocably agrees . . . that the courts of England are to have 
jurisdiction to settle any disputes which may arise out of or in 
connection with the Notes or the Coupons . . . . Nothing in this 
Condition shall limit any right to take Proceedings against the Issuer in 
any other court of competent jurisdiction . . . . 
(3) Arbitration 
The Issuer also agrees that any disputes . . . may, at the option of the 
relevant holder, be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration under 
the Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration . . . . The 
place of any such arbitration shall be London and the language 
English.155 
In this clause, arbitration does not substitute for the issuer’s consent to be 
sued in foreign courts. Rather, arbitration adds to a menu of disputing options, 
effectively permitting investors to select the forum that will maximize the 
likelihood of enforcement. 
 
Table 4. Arbitration users; submission to other external forums 
 
Issuer Governing Law Other External 
Brazil New York None 
El Salvador New York None 
Estonia English Courts of England 
Georgia English Courts of England 
Poland English Courts of England 
Slovak Republic English Courts of England 
Ukraine English Courts of England 
 
Despite these apparent differences, there may be a common theme linking 
many of these issuers: in each case, there may be greater-than-usual uncertainty 
as to whether the issuer’s courts will enforce foreign court judgments. In such 
cases, investors may assign greater value to arbitration’s ordinarily rather 
speculative enforcement advantages. For Brazil and El Salvador, the refusal to 
 
 
155. REP. OF EST., OFFERING CIRCULAR 9 (June 25, 2002) (offering 5% Notes due in 2007). 
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submit to foreign jurisdiction, or to waive immunity from suit or execution, limits 
the value of litigation in foreign courts.156 Georgia, Estonia, Ukraine, and the 
Slovak Republic are relatively new issuers of sovereign debt, each having gained 
its independence in the early 1990s.157 Each of these issuers of English-law 
bonds, moreover, gained its independence from a country whose law of 
sovereign immunity may have offered absolute immunity from suit and 
execution.158 And although each agrees to a broad immunity waiver, their 
domestic law may deny enforcement to foreign court judgments.159 For example, 
although members of the European Union recognize judgments rendered by the 
courts of other EU member states,160 Georgia and Ukraine are not EU 
 
156. Bondholders might successfully invoke the jurisdiction of foreign courts even without the 
issuer’s consent. Under U.S. law, for example, foreign states are not immune from suit (as opposed to 
execution) in actions based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign 
state. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006). See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the commercial activities exception to sovereign immunity. U.S. law, however, requires a separate 
waiver of immunity from execution, which neither country provides. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1) 
(stating foreign property in United States is not immune from attachment following adverse judgment 
if “the foreign state has waived its immunity from attachment . . . either explicitly or by implication”). 
And judgments obtained in foreign courts without the issuer’s consent to jurisdiction may not be 
enforceable in the issuer’s own courts. See, e.g., FEDERATIVE REP. OF BRAZ., supra note 154, at 13 
(“Any judgment rendered against Brazil by a court outside Brazil in an action in which Brazil has not 
submitted to the jurisdiction of such court or otherwise expressly waived its defense of sovereign 
immunity would not be enforceable against Brazil under its laws.”). 
157. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Note: Estonia, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/ 
5377.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2009) (stating independence established from U.S.S.R. in 1991); U.S. 
Dep’t of State, Background Note: Georgia, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5253.htm (last visited Dec. 
2, 2009) (stating independence obtained in 1991); U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Note: Slovakia, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3430.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2009) (noting independence gained in 
1993); U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Note: Ukraine, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3211.htm (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2009) (stating independence gained in 1991). 
158. See FOX, supra note 8, at 230–31 (describing sovereign immunity law in former 
Czechoslovakia  and Soviet Union, and in Russian Federation). Moreover, the former Soviet Union,  
from which Georgia, Estonia, and Ukraine gained independence, apparently had no domestic law 
permitting officials to waive the state’s sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Mark A. Stoleson, Note, 
Investment at an Impasse: Russia’s Production-Sharing Agreement Law and the Continuing Barriers to 
Petroleum Investment in Russia, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 671, 686 (1997) (discussing how proposal 
for new law would allow Russia to waive sovereign immunity in contracts with foreign investors). The 
Georgian, Estonian, and Ukrainian bonds, however, all contain broad immunity waivers. 
159. See UKR., OFFERING CIRCULAR 12 (Jan. 29, 2007) (offering 3.5% Notes due in 2018 and 
specifying that “[c]ourts in Ukraine will not enforce a judgment obtained in a court established in a 
country other than Ukraine unless such enforcement is envisaged by an international treaty . . . or an 
ad hoc arrangement between such country and Ukraine providing for reciprocal enforcement of 
judgments . . . [T]here is no such treaty or arrangement in effect between Ukraine and Ireland, 
Switzerland or the United Kingdom. An arbitration award would, however, generally be enforceable 
in Ukraine . . . .”); REP. OF EST., supra note 155, at 42 (similar provision); GEOR., PRELIMINARY 
PROSPECTUS 4 (Mar. 28, 2008) (similar provision); THE SLOVAK REP., OFFERING CIRCULAR 60 (June 
21, 1999) (offering 7.5% Notes due in 2004 and containing similar provision). To the extent these 
issuers keep assets in other countries, however, the immunity waiver may increase bondholders’ odds 
of successful execution. 
160. Joseph J. Simeone, The Recognition and Enforceability of Foreign Country Judgments, 37 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 341, 362 (1993). 
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members, nor were Estonia or the Slovak Republic at the time each issued the 
bonds in my sample.161 
Initially, then, it appears that issuers include arbitration clauses in their 
bonds primarily when there are particular reasons to doubt the enforceability of 
foreign court judgments. But this explanation may fail to account for the full 
variance in the use of arbitration clauses. Poland, for example, acceded to the 
Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters in 1999, thus obliging itself to enforce judgments issued by 
EU member states.162 Yet English-law bonds issued in 2002 permit bondholders 
to choose between arbitration and litigation in English courts.163 Moreover, 
arbitration clauses are sometimes absent even when there may be increased 
doubt about the enforceability of foreign court judgments. For example, English- 
law bonds issued by Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Lithuania (which are former Soviet 
republics like Georgia, Estonia, and Ukraine) confer nonexclusive jurisdiction 
on English courts but do not consent to arbitration.164 English-law bonds issued 
by Moldova, another former Soviet republic, submit to the jurisdiction of courts 
in England and New York but do not agree to arbitration in either.165 Yet at 
least some of these issuers appear to pose enforcement problems similar to those 
posed by the arbitration users.166 
 
 
161. Professor Cross notes: “The reason for allowing the lenders the option of arbitration is that 
Ukraine, similar to other sovereign issuers located in the former Eastern bloc, is not an EU member     
and therefore is not obligated to recognize court judgments rendered in EU member states.”  Cross,  
supra note 2, at 340 n.22 (citing Andrew Yianni, partner, Clifford Chance, e-mail correspondence to 
author dated Nov. 26, 2007, 8:34 am CST (on file with author)). Estonia and Slovakia joined the EU in 
2004, while the latest bonds in my sample were issued in 2002 (Estonia) and 2003 (Slovakia). Europa, 
The 2004 Enlargement: The Challenge of a 25-Member EU, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/ 
enlargement/2004_and_2007_enlargement/e50017_en.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009). 
162. Pawel Pietkiewicz & Łukasz Hejmej, The Polish Judicial System and Legal Procedure, in 
POLISH BUSINESS LAW, 43, 59 & n.134 (Zdzislaw Brodecki ed., 2003). 
163. See, e.g., THE REP. OF POL., OFFERING CIRCULAR 11–12 (Mar. 8,  2002)  (offering  5.5% 
Notes due in 2012 and providing terms for arbitration and court jurisdiction). 
164. See REP. OF KAZ., OFFERING CIRCULAR 14 (May 10, 2000) (offering 11.125% Notes due in 
2007 and detailing terms under which jurisdiction is applicable); REP. OF LAT., OFFERING CIRCULAR 10–
11 (Apr. 1, 2004) (offering 4.25% Notes due in 2014 and setting forth governing law  and  jurisdiction for 
notes and coupons); THE REP. OF LITH., OFFERING  CIRCULAR  9  (May  8,  2002) (offering 5.875% Notes 
due in 2012 and stating governing law regarding notes and coupons). 
165. See THE REP. OF MOLD., INFORMATION MEMORANDUM 17 (Dec. 5, 2002) (offering 
39,865,000 U.S. Dollar Denominated Notes due in 2009 and detailing governing law and jurisdiction). 
Of these four countries (Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova), only Latvia and Lithuania are 
EU members. Europa, supra note 161. All four are parties to the New York Arbitration Convention. 
See U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, STATUS TABLE FOR CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS 1–2, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/ 
Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXII/XXII-1.en.pdf. 
166. For example, disclosure documents indicate that courts in Kazakhstan will not enforce 
foreign judgments unless a treaty between Kazakhstan and the country in which the judgment was 
rendered provides for reciprocal enforcement, but “[t]here is no such treaty in effect between 
Kazakhstan and the United Kingdom or between Kazakhstan and the United States.” REP. OF KAZ., 
supra note 164, at 6. Disclosure documents for Moldovan bonds contain a similar caution. See THE 
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Thus, while it is tempting to attribute arbitration usage to unique concerns 
over the enforceability of foreign court judgments, questions remain. What is 
clear is that a number of issuers have issued bonds that include arbitration 
clauses, and that these are only some of the departures from the choice of forum 
standard.167 Moreover, there is additional variance across issuers in sovereign 
immunity provisions. The next section discusses these sovereign immunity 
findings. 
3. Variance Across Issuers: Sovereign Immunity Terms 
Previously, I noted that the standard set of enforcement terms also contains 
a waiver of the sovereign’s immunity from suit and perhaps execution.168 But it 
may be misleading to refer to a “standard” set of terms. The immunity waivers 
negotiated by different issuers vary to a surprising degree.169 The bond contracts 
approach immunity in one of three ways: some refuse to waive immunity 
altogether; some waive immunity from suit but not immunity from attachment 
and execution; and some waive both forms of immunity, though typically with 
exceptions for property used for public or governmental purposes. Most issuers, 
however, fall into the third category, waiving immunity both from suit and from 
execution. These issuers use sovereign immunity terms to confer on bondholders 
one of the key enforcement advantages claimed for arbitration. 
 
a. No Waiver of Immunity (at Least in Foreign Courts) 
Five issuers of New York- or English-law bonds do not waive sovereign 
immunity from either jurisdiction or execution, at least in foreign courts.170 For 
example, offering circulars describing Russian bonds caution: 
The Issuer has not waived any rights to sovereign immunity it may 
have in any jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Issuer may be entitled to 
immunity from suit in any action or proceeding arising out of the 
Bonds and the Issuer and its assets, properties and revenues may be 
entitled to immunity in any enforcement action. In addition, the Issuer 
has not submitted to the jurisdiction of any court, agreed that disputes 
may be resolved in any forum or appointed any agent for service of 
 
 
REP. OF MOLD., supra note 165, at 4 (citing lack of international treaty between Moldova and United 
States and Moldova and United Kingdom regarding enforcement of civil case judgments). 
167. See supra notes 146–50 and Table 2 for a discussion of choice of forum. 
168. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text for a discussion of sovereign immunity 
waivers. See BUCHHEIT, supra note 20, at 142 (noting that conventional waiver of immunity covers  
both sovereign’s immunity from suit and immunity of its property from attachment or execution). 
169. This variance may be driven in part by differences in issuers’ domestic laws pertaining to 
sovereign immunity. See BUCHHEIT, supra note 20, at 143 (discussing variance in domestic laws and 
potential impact on sovereign immunity). 
170. These are Australia (New York-law bonds issued in 1995), Brazil (New York-law bonds  
issued in 1999 and 2007), El Salvador (New York-law bonds issued in 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2005, and 
2006), Nova Scotia (New York-law bonds issued in 2007), and Russia (English-law bonds issued in   
1997 and 1998). Two additional issuances—Canadian-law bonds issued by the Province of Manitoba in 
2003 and 2007—also fall into this category. 
2009] DISPUTING BOILERPLATE 33 
 
process. . . . Accordingly, Bondholders may have difficulty obtaining 
effective redress in connection with the Issuer’s obligations under the 
Bonds.171 
In the case of the Russian Federation, domestic law may not authorize 
officials to waive sovereign immunity.172 However, issuers with significant 
negotiating leverage, obvious reputation for repayment, robust and effective 
legal systems, or some combination of these factors also may decline to waive 
sovereign immunity or agree only to litigation in their domestic courts. For 
example, disclosures for New York-law bonds issued by the Province of Nova 
Scotia indicate that the Province has not waived its immunity from jurisdiction 
but “does not have immunity in the courts of Nova Scotia from lawsuits based on 
the securities.”173 A bondholder who obtains a judgment from a court in Nova 
Scotia may be unable to enforce it by execution, but “must be paid by the 
Minister of Finance out of the Consolidated Fund of the Province.”174 The 
Province thus seeks to channel litigation into domestic courts and contemplates 
voluntary payment of any resulting judgment, rather than enforcement through 
execution.175 
In similar fashion, Brazil discloses in a 2007 prospectus that it has made only 
a limited waiver of its jurisdictional immunity, consenting to jurisdiction in the 
Southern District of New York solely for the purpose of converting an 
arbitration award into a judgment.176 Brazil does not waive its immunity from 
suit in foreign courts for any other purpose, nor does it waive its immunity from 
execution with respect to property located outside Brazil.177 Successful 
 
171. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 1998 OFFERING CIRCULAR, supra note 148, at 89–90; THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 1997 OFFERING CIRCULAR, supra note 148, at 85–86. 
172. At least until recently, domestic law in the Russian Federation did not permit officials to  
waive sovereign immunity. Stoleson, supra note 158, at 686. As of November 2001, the Federation had 
yet to pass legislation weakening the former rule providing for absolute sovereign  immunity.  FOX,  
supra note 8, at 126. 
173. PROVINCE OF NOVA SCOTIA (CAN.), supra note 149, at 5. Canadian-law bonds issued by the 
Province of Manitoba contain similar provisions. See PROVINCE OF MANITOBA (CAN.), PROSPECTUS 
SUPPLEMENT (TO PROSPECTUS DATED NOV. 4, 2003) 7 (Apr. 5, 2005) (offering 4.45% Debentures due 
in 2010 and noting province “does not have immunity in the courts of Manitoba from lawsuits based 
on the Securities”). 
174. PROVINCE OF NOVA SCOTIA (CAN.), supra note 149, at 5. 
175. The lack of a contract term submitting to the jurisdiction of foreign courts does  not  
necessarily prevent the issuer from being sued there. It does, however, make it more difficult for 
bondholders to obtain and enforce a foreign judgment. See infra notes 180–83 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the difficulty in enforcing a foreign judgment in the absence of  certain  contract  
terms. 
176. FEDERATIVE REP. OF BRAZ., supra note 154, at 13. 
177. Id. Brazil consents to jurisdiction in New York “for the limited purpose of converting into a 
judgment an arbitral award rendered against Brazil in New York.” Id.; see also Cross, supra note 2, 
app. I, at 378–79 (setting out terms of Fiscal Agency Agreement, in which Brazil agrees not to raise 
any immunity defenses “in any arbitration proceedings or judicial proceedings for the conversion of 
any award rendered in arbitration . . . into a judgment” (emphasis added)). Note that proceedings to 
convert an arbitration award into a judgment are not the same as proceedings to enforce the judgment 
itself—for example, by seizing and selling sovereign assets. A separate waiver of immunity of 
execution would be required for such proceedings, and Brazil appears not to provide such a waiver. 
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arbitration claimants must obtain a Brazilian court order recognizing the 
arbitration award, after which Brazilian law, at the time of the issuance, required 
that the award be included for payment in a subsequent budget.178 For actions 
brought in Brazilian courts, however, the bonds waive immunity from 
jurisdiction and execution in Brazil (except for execution on public property).179 
The fact that an issuer refuses to waive immunity from suit or execution 
does not mean that bondholders cannot sue in foreign courts. Under the FSIA, 
for example, foreign states do not enjoy immunity from suit in actions based on 
“commercial activity” that takes place within, or that has a sufficient connection 
to, the United States.180 The issuance of sovereign bonds constitutes commercial 
activity under the FSIA.181 A contractual waiver of immunity, however, can 
eliminate any threshold jurisdictional issues182 and make a broader range of 
property subject to execution.183 But as the examples in this section illustrate, 
although investors presumably value such waivers, not all sovereign issuers 
provide them. 
 
b. Waiver of Jurisdictional Immunity Only 
Bonds by another four issuers appear to waive immunity from suit in 
foreign courts, but not immunity from execution against state property.184 South 
African bonds issued in 2006 are one example: 
The South African government will irrevocably submit to the 
jurisdiction of the Federal and State courts in The City of New York, 
and will irrevocably waive any immunity from the jurisdiction 
(including sovereign immunity but not any immunity from execution or 
attachment or process in the nature thereof) of such courts and any 
objection to venue, in connection with any action arising out of or 
based upon the Notes brought by any holder of Notes.185 
 
 
178. FEDERATIVE REP. OF BRAZ., supra note 154, at 13–14. 
179. Id. at 14. 
180. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006) (stating that foreign state has no immunity from suit in 
actions based upon “a commercial activity carried on in the United States,” or “an act performed in 
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere,” or “an act 
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity . . . and that act 
causes a direct effect in the United States”). 
181. Rep. of Arg. v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614–15 (1992). 
182. See BUCHHEIT, supra note 20, at 141 (noting this benefit of contractual immunity waivers). 
183. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (stating that foreign state is not immune from suit when it has 
waived immunity); id. § 1610(a)(1) (providing that property in United States used for commercial 
activity is subject to execution if foreign state has waived immunity from execution, even if property is 
not or was not used for commercial activity upon which claim was based, as 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) 
would otherwise require). 
184. The four issuers are China (New York-law bonds issued in 2003), Finland (New York-law 
bonds issued in 1996), Italy (New York-law bonds issued in 2004), and South Africa (New York-law 
bonds issued in 2006). 
185. REP. OF S. AFR., PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (TO PROSPECTUS DATED AUG. 20, 2003) S-2 to 
S-3 (Apr. 18, 2006) (offering 4.5% Notes due in 2016). As with many other issuers, South Africa 
reserves the right to plead sovereign immunity with respect to claims under U.S. federal or state 
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In jurisdictions that recognize the so-called restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity, like the United States and United Kingdom,  such  contract  terms 
defeat threshold jurisdictional objections.186 But without a separate waiver of 
immunity from execution, creditors may have greater difficulty seizing property 
located in these jurisdictions.187 For example, it is likely that holders of  these 
South African bonds could execute against property used for a  commercial 
activity within the United States only if the property “is or was used for the 
commercial activity upon which the [bondholders’] claim is based.”188 As an 
alternative, bondholders may file suit in South African courts, and they may also 
seek to enforce foreign judgments in South Africa. In  either  case,  however, 
South African law may not permit execution against state property. Rather, the 
State Liability Act currently requires any judgments to be paid out  of  the 
National Revenue Fund.189 
 
c. Waiver of Immunity from Jurisdiction and Execution 
The most common category of sovereign immunity waiver extends to both 
jurisdiction and execution.190 Sixty-three of the seventy-two issuers (87.5%) in 
the sample agreed to such a waiver. Note that these clauses effectively provide 
one of the primary enforcement benefits claimed for arbitration.191 That is, they 
permit bondholders who obtain court judgments to execute upon property of a 
foreign state “used for a commercial activity in the United States” without 
demonstrating any nexus to the “commercial activity upon which the claim is 
based.”192 They may also facilitate enforcement in other jurisdictions where such 
waivers are recognized. 
 
securities laws. Id. at S-3; see also Choi & Gulati, supra note 138, at 1035–36 n.44 (discussing import of 
issuer’s refusal to waive immunity with respect to securities law claims). 
186. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (stating immunity can be waived implicitly or explicitly); FOX, 
supra note 8, at 146 (noting that State Immunity Act of 1978 allows prior written agreements which 
bind state in advance to court jurisdiction). 
187. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (providing commercial activity exception to immunity from 
execution); FOX, supra note 8, at 146 (providing that, under State Immunity Act of 1978, general 
immunity waiver does not imply immunity waiver for execution of judgment). 
188. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2). The requirement that there be a nexus between the commercial 
property located in the United States and the “commercial activity upon which the claim is based” is 
absent where the sovereign has waived immunity from execution. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1). 
189. REP. OF S. AFR., supra note 184, at S-32. For a discussion of current developments regarding 
the State Liability Act, including whether creditors may in fact be able to execute upon or attach state 
assets, see generally SHAMEELA SEEDAT, INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA, NON- 
COMPLIANCE BY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS WITH COURT ORDERS: WILL SECTION 3 OF THE 
STATE LIABILITY ACT BE STRUCK DOWN BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT? (2007), available at 
http://www.idasa.org.za/gbOutputFiles.asp?WriteContent=Y&RID=1981. 
190. In some cases, the issuer’s domestic law may bar execution on sovereign property located 
within its own jurisdiction, but the issuer still waives its immunity from execution for assets located 
elsewhere. I include these bonds in this category. 
191. See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text for a discussion of foreign states’ more 
limited immunity from attachment and execution under U.S. law. 
192. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (declaring property not immune from execution if it “is or 
was used for commercial activity upon which the claim is based”), with id. § 1610(a)(6) (declaring 
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Consider a fairly typical clause from the Republic of Hungary: 
To the extent that the Republic may in any jurisdiction claim for itself 
or its assets or its revenues immunity from suit, execution, attachment 
. . . the Republic agrees not to claim and irrevocably waives such 
immunity to the fullest extent permitted by the laws of such 
jurisdiction, provided that the Republic does not waive any immunity 
with respect to: (i) present or future “premises of the mission” as 
defined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations signed in 
1961, (ii) “consular premises” as defined in the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations signed in 1963, (iii) any other property or assets 
used solely for official state purposes in the Republic of Hungary or 
elsewhere, or (iv) military property or assets of the Republic of 
Hungary related thereto.193 
This clause exempts from execution property used for diplomatic or 
military, or for “public” or “governmental,” as opposed to commercial, purposes. 
These exemptions serve an obvious function: “If a foreign bank were to attempt 
to levy against the Presidential Palace or the state orphanage, for example, this 
would almost certainly prompt a phone call to the unfortunate lawyer who 
negotiated the loan agreement on behalf of the sovereign borrower.”194 
Even the issuers who waive immunity from suit and execution, however, 
vary in the extent to which they expressly exempt property from execution. For 
example, some do not exempt noncommercial property from execution. Contrast 
the preceding clause with the following extraordinarily broad waiver of 
sovereign immunity described in a 2002 offering circular from Estonia: 
The Issuer hereby  irrevocably  and  unconditionally  waives  and  agrees  
not to raise . . . any right to  claim  sovereign,  diplomatic  or  other  
immunity from jurisdiction or execution and any similar defence, and 
irrevocably and unconditionally consents to  the  giving  of  any  relief  or  
the issue of any process, including, without limitation, the making, 
enforcement or execution against any property whatsoever (irrespective 
of its use or intended use) ..... 195 
What are the implications of this extraordinarily broad language? For example, 
has Estonia waived immunity from execution for its embassies in London and 
Washington, D.C.? 
In all likelihood, the answer is that this broad language is functionally 
similar, if not identical, to the much more cautiously worded waiver provision in 
the Hungarian bonds. Diplomatic property is immune from execution under the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, notwithstanding the sovereign’s 
 
 
property not immune from execution if judgment is “based on an order confirming an arbitral award 
rendered against the foreign state, provided that attachment in aid of execution, or execution, would      
not be inconsistent with any provision in the arbitral agreement”). See supra notes 123–26 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of differences between arbitration and litigation in the scope of a 
foreign state’s immunity from attachment and execution. 
193. REP. OF HUNG., OFFERING CIRCULAR 11 (Feb. 5, 2003) (offering 4.5% Notes due in 2013). 
194. BUCHHEIT, supra note 20, at 143. 
195. REP. OF EST., supra note 155, at 9 (emphasis added). 
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advance waiver of immunity.196 Under U.S. law, moreover, the FSIA recognizes 
such waivers only with respect to property “used for a commercial activity in the 
United States.”197 Property used or intended to be used in connection with a 
military activity is likewise exempt from execution whether or not the sovereign 
has waived immunity in advance.198 These and other limitations highlight the 
general difficulty bondholders have enforcing judgments against defaulting 
issuers—a difficulty that remains whether the issuer agrees to arbitration, waives 
its sovereign immunity, or both.199 
Despite these reasons for doubting the practical significance of Estonia’s 
broad waiver, other issuers with similarly broad waivers of immunity do carve    
out specific exemptions for diplomatic, consular, and military property. Thus, 
English-law bonds issued by Latvia in 2004 expressly exempt diplomatic, 
consular, and military property from execution.200 Even these bonds, however, 
omit the express exemption, found in the Hungarian bonds, for “official” or 
“public” property located in the sovereign’s own territory or elsewhere.201 
 
196. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 22, done Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T 3227, 500 
U.N.T.S. 95; EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: A COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON 
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 129 (1998); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(4)(B) (stating that exception to 
immunity from execution for judgments establishing rights in property does not apply to property 
“used for purposes of maintaining a diplomatic or consular mission or the residence of the Chief of 
such mission”); S&S Mach. Co. v. Masinexportimport, 802 F. Supp. 1109, 1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(denying judgment creditor’s request for attachment of Romanian consulate building notwithstanding 
Romanian government’s waiver, by treaty, of immunity). 
197. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (listing limited exceptions under which commercial property of 
foreign states located within the United States can be attached); Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Rep. of 
Liber., 659 F. Supp. 606, 609 (D.D.C. 1987) (noting two-step analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1) that 
requires foreign states to waive immunity and use attached property for commercial activity). An 
arbitration award confers no advantage here; holders of such awards may only execute on  property  
“used for a commercial activity in the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(6). 
198. See 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(2) (stating that, regardless of whether there has been waiver of 
immunity sufficient under § 1610, property is immune from execution if it is, or “is intended to be,     
used in connection with a military activity and is . . . [either] of a military character, or . . . is under the 
control of a military authority or defense agency”). 
199. Conceivably, the broad waiver might have greater force in other jurisdictions in  which  
Estonia keeps significant assets, including within Estonia itself, but that prospect seems speculative at 
best. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 
261, for example, does not expressly extend to consular premises the same immunity from execution 
extended to diplomatic premises by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. See S&S Mach. 
Co., 802 F. Supp. at 1111 n.5. Perhaps Estonia’s failure to exempt consular property from its waiver of 
immunity from execution would strengthen a creditor’s hand in seeking to execute on such property.    
But the prospect of successful enforcement proceedings still seems remote.  See  id.  (denying  
attachment of consular property). See generally August Reinisch, European Court Practice Concerning 
State Immunity from Enforcement Measures, 17 EUR. J. INT’L LAW 803 (2006) (describing approaches 
to enforcement immunity in number of European countries, including general recognition of immunity 
for property serving sovereign or governmental purposes). 
200. REP. OF LAT., supra note 164, at 11. For a similar waiver provision, see THE REP. OF LITH., 
supra note 163, at 9. 
201. See supra note 193 and accompanying text for a Hungarian offering circular that exempts 
property “used solely for official state purposes” from immunity. See KINGDOM OF MOROCCO,  
OFFERING CIRCULAR 7 (July 7, 2003) (offering 5% Notes due in 2008 and exempting “property 
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Thus, there remain differences in the immunity provisions even among 
issuers who generally waive immunity from both suit and execution. These 
differences may be of modest practical significance and in some cases may reflect 
variance among issuers’ domestic laws related to sovereign immunity.202 
Nevertheless, it is curious that the disclosure documents would contain such 
variation. Some issuers, moreover, quite clearly negotiate substantively 
meaningful changes to the standard broad waiver of sovereign immunity. 
Russia’s refusal to waive sovereign immunity from suit or jurisdiction is an 
example.203 Across issuers, then, it is perhaps misleading to describe the dispute 
resolution provisions in sovereign bonds as “boilerplate.” 
4. Limited Variance Within Issuers 
Nevertheless, if enforcement-related terms vary across issuers, individual 
issuers do not often change the terms they have adopted. I have multiple sets of 
disclosure documents for only sixteen issuers, averaging 3.2 disclosure 
documents for each of these sixteen. Thus, despite the breadth of the dataset, it 
is not especially “deep,” and the conclusions in this section are somewhat 
tentative. 
With that caveat, however, the issuers in the current sample rarely 
introduce significant changes to their established enforcement-related 
contracting practices. With the exception of Poland, the issuers in my sample do 
not vary the choice of forum or sovereign immunity terms across different same- 
law issuances.204 Focusing on a subset of issuers, Table 5 represents the relative 
 
located in Morocco dedicated to a public or governmental use (as opposed to a commercial use) by the 
Kingdom”). 
202. For example, sovereign borrowers whose domestic law does not forbid execution on 
property used for public or governmental purposes may include express exemptions for such property. 
BUCHHEIT, supra note 20, at 143. 
203. See supra notes 171–72 and accompanying text for further discussion of Russian bonds. 
204. This is true for same-law issuances. For example, if its New York-law bonds provide for 
litigation in New York, and the issuer subsequently issues English-law bonds providing for litigation in 
England, I do not consider this a change in bond terms. It is, rather, the issuance of bonds that 
conform to the alternate standard. Compare REP. OF THE PHIL., OFFERING CIRCULAR 16 (Sept. 5, 
2002) (offering 7.5% Bonds due in 2007 and providing for litigation in English courts), with REP. OF 
THE PHIL., PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT FOR 6.375% GLOBAL BONDS DUE 2032 (Jan. 9, 2007) (registered 
New York-law bonds; litigation in New York courts). 
In addition to the exception referenced in the text, there is one other possible exception: South 
Africa. The prospectus supplement for a 2006 registered offering of New York-law bonds makes clear 
that South Africa has not waived its immunity from execution. REP. OF S. AFR., supra note 185, at S-3. 
No such limitation appears in the prospectus supplement for a similar 2007 issuance, which states only 
that South Africa has not waived its immunity for claims based on U.S. securities laws. REP. OF S. 
AFR., PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (TO PROSPECTUS, DATED AUG. 20, 2003) S-11 (May 16, 2007) 
(offering 5.875% Notes due in 2022). And the underlying prospectus states that South Africa “will 
irrevocably waive any immunity to which it might otherwise be entitled” and thus implies a broader 
waiver of sovereign immunity. REP. OF S. AFR., PROSPECTUS 8–9 (Aug. 20, 2003) (offering debt 
securities and warrants to purchase debt securities). Both the 2006 and 2007 bonds, however, were 
issued pursuant to an Amended and Restated Fiscal Agency Agreement between South Africa and 
Deutsche Bank, to which the form of the bond is attached. And the bond itself states that South Africa 
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continuity of enforcement-related bond terms over time (with changes marked 
by the symbol “•”). Note that bond terms may remain unchanged despite 
changes in the law firms representing the issuer or underwriters.205 Note, too, 
that different issuers may adopt different enforcement-related terms even 



































does not waive its “immunity from execution or attachment or process in the nature thereof.” Form of 
Registered Security, Attached as Exhibit A to Amended and Restated Fiscal Agency Agreement, 
dated as of May 15, 2003 between Rep. of South Africa and Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas. Thus, 
it appears that in each case the issuer waives only its immunity from jurisdiction. 
205. For example, Table 5 shows that El Salvador’s enforcement-related terms remain 
unchanged despite the switch from Brown & Wood to Arnold & Porter as counsel to the issuer, and 
the switch from Rogers & Wells to Cleary Gottlieb as counsel to the underwriter. Likewise, Ukraine’s 
enforcement terms remain unchanged despite transitions from White & Case to Linklaters as issuer’s 
counsel and from Allen & Overy to Clifford Chance as underwriters’ counsel. 
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As Table 5 shows for that subset of issuers, enforcement-related bond terms 
do not often change. The exception is Poland, which apparently issued English- 
law bonds in 1995 that provided for litigation in English courts, added an 
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arbitration clause from bonds issued in 2008. A second exception (not noted in 
Table 5) involves a minor change, but one that usefully highlights the role law 
firms may play in designing and disseminating new contract terms. Although all 
of the El Salvadoran bonds in my sample provide for arbitration in New York 
under rules developed by the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law, the arbitration provision changed between 2000 and 2001.207 The 
2001 bonds specify the number of arbitrators (three) and the method of their 
selection, contain provisions addressing the nationality of the third arbitrator, 
and explicitly state that claims under U.S. securities laws are not subject to 
arbitration.208 The arbitration clause in the 2000 bonds does not address these 
issues.209 
Apparently, the law firm representing the issuer is responsible for this 
change to the El Salvadoran bonds. Prior to 2001, El Salvador was represented 
by Brown & Wood on the issuances in my sample, but it was represented by 
Arnold & Porter in 2001 and thereafter. Arnold & Porter also represented 
Brazil, and the language added in 2001 to the El Salvadoran bonds is identical to 
significant portions of the Brazilian arbitration clause.210 Although the change in 
El Salvadoran bond terms is modest, it is consistent with the view that law firms 
and other repeat-player intermediaries can drive the adoption and dissemination 




207. Typically, the disclosure documents describe the terms of the underlying bonds in detail, but 
occasionally the disclosures quote bond terms in full, as with the offering circulars for El Salvadoran 
bonds described in the text. See THE REP. OF EL SAL., OFFERING CIRCULAR 3 (Jan. 24, 2000) (offering 
10% fixed rate Notes due in 2007 and providing arbitration terms). 
208. See THE REP. OF EL SAL., OFFERING CIRCULAR v (July 18, 2001) (offering 8.5% Notes due 
in 2011). Issuers typically refuse to waive sovereign immunity for claims under U.S. securities laws. For 
an explanation of the import of that refusal, see Choi & Gulati, supra note 138, at 1035–36 n.44. 
209. THE REP. OF EL SAL., supra note 207, at 3. 
210. In my sample, Arnold & Porter represented El Salvador on private issuances governed by 
New York law in 2001, 2002, 2005, and 2006, and it represented Brazil on registered offerings in 1999 
and 2007. Each issuer’s arbitration clause provides that: 
• The arbitration is to be conducted under UNCITRAL rules “(excluding Article 26 
thereof),” which authorizes the arbitrators to issue interim measures of protection upon 
request; 
• “The number of arbitrators shall be three, to be appointed in accordance with Section II 
of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules”; 
• “The appointing authority shall be the Chairman of the International Court of 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce”; and 
• “The third arbitrator may be (but need not be) of the same nationality as any of the 
parties to the arbitration.” 
THE REP. OF EL SAL., supra note 154, at v; Cross, supra note 2, at app. 1 (quoting Fiscal Agency 
Agreement, Braz.-Bank of N.Y. (successor-in-interest to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.), Nov. 1, 1996). 
I cannot rule out the possibility that the underwriters or their lawyers were responsible for this change 
to the El Salvadoran bonds. However, these firms do not overlap on the bonds in my sample. 
211. E.g., Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 935–37; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 736–40. 
212. See infra notes 266–91 and accompanying text for a discussion of contract innovation, 
including the role played by intermediaries. 
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III. IMPLICATIONS 
As it turns out, there is relatively substantial variance in the enforcement- 
related contracting practices of different sovereign issuers. This variance includes 
departures from the choice of forum “standard” by over twenty percent of the 
issuers in the sample,213 including 9.7% who have issued bonds containing 
arbitration clauses.214 Similarly situated issuers, moreover, sometimes make 
different choices with respect to arbitration, although their reasons for doing so 
are unclear.215 And there is additional variance in sovereign immunity terms, 
although a sizeable majority of issuers waive immunity from both jurisdiction 
and execution.216 At the same time, individual issuers rarely change their own 
contracting practices. 
This Part explores the potential implications of these findings. It begins, 
however, with a cautionary note. As noted previously, it is difficult to discern the 
forces that shape contracting practices.217 One reason for this is the obvious fact 
that parties may have diverse preferences. Although it is tempting to assign 
universal values to contract terms—to assume, say, that arbitration would benefit 
or disadvantage all sovereign issuers in the same way—the reality is likely 
different. Moreover, issuers may provoke different market reactions despite 
using the same contract term. For example, collective action clauses (“CACs”) 
allow a supermajority of bondholders (typically around seventy-five percent) to 
modify key financial terms in sovereign bonds.218 There is some evidence that 
issuers deemed to pose a low risk of default obtain pricing benefits by including 
CACs in their bonds, while high-risk borrowers pay a premium.219 This pattern 
suggests that market participants might interpret particular contract terms to 
signal elevated risk, but only when adopted by certain classes of issuers.220 In 
similar fashion, perhaps higher-risk issuers would pay a premium for departures 
from the “standard” dispute resolution term. Such changes, after all, might signal 
 
 
213. See supra notes 146–50 and Table 2 for further discussion of choice of forum. 
214. See supra note 152 and accompanying text and Table 2 for those countries that expressly 
permit arbitration. See supra note 152 for a discussion of how bondholders may sometimes invoke 
arbitration provisions in bilateral investment treaties. 
215. See supra notes 163–66 and accompanying text for a discussion of these issuers. 
216. See supra Part III.B.3 for a discussion of approaches to sovereign immunity from execution. 
217. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulty in drawing 
conclusions from any given degree of standardization. 
218. Until the inclusion of CACs became widespread, sovereign bonds governed by New York 
law typically required unanimous bondholder consent. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 5, at 1628–29. 
219. Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing 
Costs? An Update and Additional Results 8 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2363, 
2000), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/users/eichengr/research/governinglawnew.pdf. For such 
issuers, the desire to preserve future access to credit markets may adequately deter default and, “in the 
exceptional circumstance that they have difficulties in servicing their debts,  the  fact  that  they  can 
resort to provisions facilitating the orderly restructuring of their obligations is viewed positively by the 
markets.” Id. For high-risk borrowers, however, “the presence of collective-action clauses significantly 
aggravates moral hazard and increases borrowing costs.” Id. 
220. Id. 
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that the parties are already thinking about the consequences of default.221 These 
possibilities complicate any attempt to  interpret  actual  contracting  practices. 
And the effort is complicated further by the vagaries of the contract drafting 
process itself.222 
Despite these qualifications, some conclusions begin to emerge from an 
analysis of these sovereign bond contracts. First, there is little reason to presume 
a strong and widely held preference for arbitration. Thus, the answer to the 
“puzzle” of why more sovereign bond contracts do not choose arbitration may 
be that few parties care to choose it, rather than anything having to do with 
contract stickiness. Second, the sovereign debt literature’s emphasis on learning 
and network effects, though perhaps legitimate, may have led observers to 
assume greater uniformity across issuers than is in fact the case. The pattern 
observed here suggests that contracting practices may be more diverse than is 
often assumed. Finally, there are potential implications for the study of contract 
innovation and change. In particular, the use of arbitration by relatively minor 
players in the sovereign debt world calls for greater attention to the forces that 
drive innovation among less-established and lower-status players. 
 
A. The Diminished Functional Case for Sovereign Debt Arbitration 
To begin with the question of sovereign debt arbitration: Is there reason to 
believe that market participants should strongly prefer arbitration to litigation? 
There is cause for doubt. Recall the two primary advantages claimed for 
arbitration over litigation: neutrality and ease of enforcement.223 Previously, I 
expressed skepticism that many sovereign issuers view arbitration as significantly 
more neutral than litigation, even when compared to New York or English 
courts.224 Of course, it is an empirical question whether and under what 
conditions issuers prefer arbitration to litigation, and my findings do not address 
that question directly. They do, however, undercut an important component of 




221. Conversely, perhaps changes to these contract terms would be interpreted more negatively 
for lower-risk issuers, who (by hypothesis) should give little if any thought to the consequences of 
default. 
222. For example, some  have suggested  that the early inclusion of collective action clauses in  
New York-law bonds was due, at least in part, to the inadvertence of the drafting attorneys. See, e.g., 
Mark Gugiatti & Anthony Richards, The Use of Collective Action Clauses in New York Law Bonds of 
Sovereign Borrowers, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 815, 825–28 (2004) (attributing early inclusion of CACs in 
some New York law bonds, at least in part, to inadvertence; in each  case,  underwriters  were  
represented by New York law firm’s London office, whose lawyers presumably began with standard 
terms and conditions taken from English-law bonds, where CACs were standard). But see  Anna  
Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Innovation After the Revolution: Foreign Sovereign Bond Contracts Since 
2003, 4 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 85, 90 (2009) (suggesting that early adoption of CACs may have been “a 
distinct mode of contractual innovation”). 
223. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text for a further discussion of arbitration’s  
claimed benefits over litigation. 
224. See supra Part II.A.1 for a critical assessment of arbitration’s supposed neutrality benefit. 
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A central argument for the superior enforceability of arbitration awards is 
that, when seeking to execute on sovereign assets located in the United States, 
the holder of a judgment based on an arbitration award need not show that the 
property to be seized bears a nexus to the “commercial activity upon which the 
claim is based.”225 Yet contract terms waiving sovereign immunity from 
execution also confer this benefit, and over eighty-five percent of the issuers in 
my sample include broad immunity waivers in their bonds.226 This practice 
significantly weakens even the theoretical advantages arbitration might offer as 
an enforcement tool.227 
Of course, arbitration offers other potential benefits, such as limited judicial 
review in countries where bondholders might seek to enforce an arbitration 
award.228 But for reasons I have already discussed, these benefits are quite 
speculative.229 Indeed, actual contracting practices suggest that market 
participants generally share this skepticism. The most commonly used term, 
which pairs a broad immunity waiver with a forum selection clause calling for 
litigation, is consistent with commercial lending practices generally230 and 
minimizes whatever potential enforcement benefits arbitration might offer. Any 
residual enforcement benefits would have to be weighed against the potential 
costs associated with the selection of a relatively untested—and unsubsidized— 
forum. It may be that this calculus usually favors litigation. This conclusion 
draws support from the fact that arbitration clauses appear with some frequency 
when arbitration’s enforcement benefits are greatest. Thus, arbitration clauses 
often appear when there is particular reason to doubt that the issuer’s courts will 
enforce judgments rendered by foreign courts.231 The relatively frequent use of 
arbitration in this context, and its infrequent use otherwise, suggests that market 






225. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1), (a)(6) (2006) (permitting execution on property used for 
commercial activity in United States if foreign state has waived immunity or if judgment is based on 
order confirming arbitral award), with id. § 1610(a)(2) (permitting execution on property used for 
commercial activity in United States only if property also “is or was used for the commercial activity 
upon which the claim is based”). 
226. See supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text for a discussion of this broad waiver of 
immunity. 
227. If an issuer will not agree to waive its immunity from execution, it is unclear why it would 
agree to confer a similar benefit by agreeing to arbitration. 
228. See supra notes 128–33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the minimal value of 
limited judicial review in enforcing sovereign debt arbitration awards. 
229. See supra notes 115–21 and accompanying text for a discussion questioning the likelihood of 
voluntary payments. See supra notes 128–33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the limitations 
of judicial enforcement of arbitration awards. 
230. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text for a discussion of why arbitration clauses 
appear infrequently in commercial lending contracts. 
231. See supra notes 156–66 and accompanying text for a discussion of this explanation and its 
limits. 
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B. The Network Explanation Revisited 
If the foregoing discussion is correct, there is no need to invoke network 
theory, or any other theory of default rule stickiness, to explain the relatively 
infrequent use of arbitration in sovereign bonds. Of course, this does not mean 
that standardization poses no barrier to innovation—that it is literally irrelevant 
to contracting practices. Widespread use of a term may deter innovation without 
preventing it entirely.232 In fact, there is arguably some evidence consistent with 
the presence of learning and network effects in the sample here. In particular, a 
few countries, such as Kazakhstan and Moldova, have issued bonds that do not 
include arbitration clauses even when arbitration might add some enforcement 
value.233 There may be particular reasons why these former Soviet republics do 
not use arbitration, but one might also characterize these failures to use 
arbitration as evidence of network benefits associated with the choice of forum 
standard. That is, these issuers adhere to the standard even when arbitration 
might plausibly offer some enforcement advantages. 
Nevertheless, several patterns apparent in sovereign debt contracting 
practices suggest that the power of the dispute resolution “standard” may be 
rather modest. First, it is not uncommon for issuers to depart from the choice of 
forum standard or to include restrictive immunity waivers that may reduce the 
effectiveness of enforcement proceedings. Thus, Russian bonds do not consent 
to the jurisdiction of any court, in any jurisdiction.234 Likewise, bonds issued by 
Australia and by Nova Scotia do not submit to the jurisdiction of any external 
forum, although these issuers do consent to be sued in their own courts.235 
Several other issuers, including China, Finland, Italy, and South Africa, have 
issued bonds that submit to the jurisdiction of foreign courts but that do not 
waive the issuer’s sovereign immunity from execution.236 A second pattern 
involves the adoption of arbitration clauses by relatively new entrants to the 
sovereign debt markets, including Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine, and the Slovak 
Republic.237 A third, and related, pattern is that when arbitration’s benefits are 
most plausible—because the issuer’s courts may not enforce foreign court 
judgments—arbitration clauses appear with some frequency.238 As noted 
previously,239 a few issuers that apparently fall into this category do not use 
arbitration, but these appear to be a minority. 
 
232. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 729 (noting that, when present, “learning and 
network benefits . . . increase the degree of contract standardization”). 
233. See supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text for further discussion of these bonds. 
234. Indeed, the offering documents caution that even Russian courts may “decline jurisdiction” 
over suits brought to enforce defaulted debt obligations. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 1998 OFFERING 
CIRCULAR, supra note 148, at 90; THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 1997 OFFERING CIRCULAR, supra note 
148, at 86. 
235. See supra note 149 for more information on these bonds. 
236. See supra note 184 and accompanying text for more information on these bonds. 
237. See supra note 153 for more information on these bonds. 
238. See supra notes 156–61 and accompanying text for a discussion of this use of arbitration. 
239. See supra notes 164–67 and accompanying text for a discussion of bonds issued by 
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova. 
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These patterns do not disprove the existence of learning and network 
effects, but they are difficult to square with the claim that widespread use of the 
default litigation term seriously deters issuers who wish to depart from the 
standard. In each pattern, issuers forego the widely used dispute resolution term 
in favor of a custom term. These departures from the standard add up. With 
respect to choice of forum clauses alone, over twenty percent of the issuers 
depart from the choice of forum standard, whether by providing for no 
enforcement forum whatsoever, by submitting only to the jurisdiction of the 
borrower’s own courts, or by submitting to arbitration either alone or in 
conjunction with the jurisdiction of one or more foreign courts.240 There is 
additional variance across issuers in sovereign immunity provisions. Because 
contract terms are likely to be at their stickiest when market participants rarely 
negotiate custom terms,241 the relatively frequent use of nonstandard terms 
suggests that the stickiness of enforcement-related terms may be overstated. 
The more intriguing pattern may be the general consistency within the 
bonds issued by each issuer.242 If there is little evidence of potent learning and 
network benefits accruing from widespread use of dispute resolution terms, the 
evidence is consistent with the belief that established contracting practices are 
difficult to change.243 There are exceptions. Poland and El Salvador, for 
example, have issued bonds with varied dispute resolution terms.244 In general, 
however, the issuers in this sample rarely changed their existing terms. Perhaps 
this consistency evidences the presence of switching costs, or some other 
mechanism that might deter changes to established dispute resolution terms. For 
example, any change to enforcement-related terms might be interpreted to signal 
an increased likelihood of default.245 In addition, because a default will likely 
implicate multiple bond issuances, it may complicate matters for outstanding 
bonds to be governed by different dispute resolution terms. Issuers could address 
this problem by amending existing bonds, but it is potentially expensive to do 
so.246 Finally, analysts and investors may have trouble assessing the pricing 
implications of altered bond terms, and this may lead issuers to resist changing 
established practices. 
 
240. See supra notes 146–50 and Table 2 for a discussion of choice of forum. 
241. Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 3, at 653. 
242. See supra notes 204–10 and accompanying text for a discussion of within-issuer consistency 
in bond terms. 
243. As noted previously, because the sample is not especially deep, these conclusions about 
within-issuer consistency remain tentative. 
244. See supra Part II.B.4 for a discussion of Poland and El Salvador’s issuance of bonds with 
varied dispute resolution terms. 
245. Cf. Waibel, supra note 2, at 732 n.131 (“[S]overeign bonds with arbitration clauses . . . could 
implicitly recognize the possibility of eventual default and thereby negatively affect their 
marketability; the inclusion of arbitration clauses is therefore generally avoided, leaving domestic 
courts the forum of choice.”). 
246. Once bonds have been issued, changes may require bondholder consent, and  obtaining  
consent is expensive. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 728 n.40. For a related discussion of 
difficulties issuing new bonds with CACs, see Steven L. Schwarcz, “Idiot’s Guide” to Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1189, 1203 (2004). 
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On further scrutiny, however, at least the first two of these arguments are 
unconvincing. To begin with, they implicitly view arbitration as a litigation 
substitute, and it may indeed serve that function in some cases. But existing 
contracting practices also suggest that arbitration might be offered to creditors as 
an additional disputing option. Thus, Estonia, Georgia, Poland, Ukraine, and the 
Slovak Republic have all issued bonds permitting creditors to initiate arbitration 
proceedings, litigation in English courts, or litigation before “any other court of 
competent jurisdiction.”247 Even Brazil and El Salvador offer arbitration as an 
alternative to litigation in the issuer’s own courts.248 Historically, of course, 
litigation in the borrower’s courts has not been an appealing option to creditors, 
although it is not unprecedented for lenders to confer exclusive jurisdiction on 
those courts.249 Sovereign debt, however, is increasingly held by the issuer’s own 
citizens.250 To the extent it becomes difficult to discriminate between foreign and 
domestic bondholders, litigation in domestic courts may become a more 
palatable option.251 
If we conceptualize arbitration as an additional disputing forum available at 
the option of creditors, it becomes harder to sustain the argument that issuers 
would incur substantial costs adding an arbitration clause to existing bond terms. 
The dispute resolution “standard” already contemplates litigation in multiple 
forums, because issuers generally submit to the nonexclusive jurisdiction of New 
York or English courts.252 Adding arbitration as a disputing option, while leaving 
existing options intact, would simply expand the range of options already 
available in the event of a default. Perhaps few issuers would agree to confer 
such a benefit on holders of existing bonds. But given the range of forums 
already available to bondholders,253 adding an arbitration clause to new bonds 
would only modestly expand the number of forums in which issuers might have 
to defend against bondholder claims.254 And finally, amending existing contracts 
 
247. GEOR., supra note 159, at 81–82; REP. OF EST., supra note 155, at 9; THE REP. OF POL., supra 
note 163, at 11; THE SLOVAK REP., supra note 159, at 16; UKR., OFFERING MEMORANDUM 49–50 (Feb. 
9, 2000). The litigation option may be valuable to bondholders even if the issuer’s courts will not 
recognize foreign court judgments, particularly with respect to assets located in other jurisdictions. 
248. FEDERATIVE REP. OF BRAZ., PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT 11 (Oct. 18, 1999) (supplement to 
offering of 14.5% Bonds due in 2009); THE REP. OF EL SAL., OFFERING CIRCULAR iv (July 13, 2006) 
(offering for 7.65% Notes due in 2035). 
249. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 107, at 58 (recounting agreement by commercial banks to 
submit to exclusive jurisdiction of sovereign courts after failing in their efforts to obtain arbitration 
clause). 
250. Gelpern, supra note 5, at 154. 
251. It may also generate demand for other, standardized means of dispute resolution, such as 
arbitration. Id. at 157–58. 
252. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the choice of forum 
standard. 
253. In many cases, arbitration may already be an option for a subset of bondholders under 
bilateral investment treaties between the issuer and their home countries. See supra note 152 for a 
discussion of BITs. 
254. Moreover, issuers who wished to harmonize the choice of forum terms in their outstanding 
bonds could in many cases do so without substantial cost. Changes that do not adversely affect 
bondholder interests may not require bondholder consent. See, e.g., REP. OF COSTA RICA, OFFERING 
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to offer creditors additional disputing options hardly seems to signal increased 
likelihood of default. If anything, such a change would signal the issuer’s 
confidence in its ability to repay. 
Nevertheless, it remains possible that pricing difficulties would deter issuers 
from modifying established contracting practices.255 If issuers suspect that 
arbitration will confer benefits on bondholders but do not see their borrowing 
costs reduced accordingly, they may be reluctant to agree to such terms. Even 
this possibility, however, remains speculative. As I have already discussed, the 
evidence suggests that market participants do not view arbitration as a preferred 
forum. Of course, preferences may change over time. Although there is a 
substantial history of investor-state arbitration, there is little experience 
arbitrating claims arising from defaulted sovereign bonds.256 ICSID tribunals, 
however, are now presiding over arbitrations arising out of Argentina’s 2001 
default.257 If experience with these proceedings gives creditors or issuers reasons 
to prefer arbitration, we might expect contracts to adjust accordingly. The lack of 
such an adjustment would provide some support for the stickiness explanation. 
At present, however, there is little reason to suspect that existing choice of forum 
provisions do not reflect contracting preferences. Understanding whether bond 
terms are resistant to change will have to await some reason for change. 
 
C. Broader Implications: Contract Diversity and Innovation 
Even if standardization poses little barrier to the adoption of preferred 
enforcement-related terms, that does not mean it is irrelevant to sovereign debt 
contracting practices. Some contract terms may be stickier than others.258 But 
the findings reported here have some general implications for the study of 
 
 
CIRCULAR 16 (Feb. 22, 2001) (offering 9% Notes due in 2011 and permitting Republic and Fiscal 
Agent to modify Fiscal Agency Agreement or Notes without bondholder consent or vote “for the 
purpose of . . . surrendering any rights or power conferred upon the Republic . . . or . . . in any manner 
which shall not adversely affect the interest of any holder of Notes in any material respect”). 
255. One explanation for the pattern suggested by my sample—that new issuers sometimes adopt 
nonstandard terms but established terms rarely change—is that it may be easier for analysts and 
investors to price entirely new bonds than it is to determine the pricing implications of slight 
modifications to existing bond terms. As the text indicates, issuers might resist including arbitration 
clauses if they suspect such clauses will confer benefits on bondholders but will not result in lower 
borrowing costs. 
256. For the most extensive empirical analysis of investor-state arbitration, see generally Franck, 
supra note 100. One of the rare international arbitrations involving sovereign loans is the ICSID case 
Fedax N.V. v. Rep. of Venezuela, involving a claim by an assignee of Venezuelan promissory notes. 
ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3 (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1391. 
257. See Alemanni v. Argentine Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8 (registered Mar. 27, 2007).  
These claims are subject to ICSID arbitration because bilateral investment treaties between Argentina  
and the countries in which the bondholders are citizens provide for arbitration, not because Argentine 
bonds permit arbitration. See supra note 152 and accompanying text for a further  discussion  of  
bilateral investment treaty arbitration and its applicability to sovereign bonds. 
258. For example, Professors Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati report evidence consistent with the 
view that standardization, rather than preference, explains the widespread use of unanimous action 
clauses in New York-law bonds before 2000. Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 963–66. 
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sovereign debt and for research into contract innovation and change. This final 
section briefly explores these implications. 
Researchers who study contract change often focus (as I have done) on the 
terms that pique their interest. Empirical analyses of sovereign debt, for 
example, generally focus on particular contract terms, such as CACs,259 without 
explicitly contemplating variance in terms other than the ones under study.260 
This is consistent with the general understanding that sovereign debt instruments 
are, for the most part, boilerplate. It is also consistent with network theory’s 
emphasis on the benefits accruing from widespread use of contract terms. But 
the sovereign debt literature’s emphasis on network theory, while legitimate, 
may have led researchers to assume greater uniformity than in fact exists. The 
diversity across issuers in largely overlooked, enforcement-related bond terms 
undercuts this understanding and cautions that bond contracts may be less 
standardized than is often thought.261 Indeed, recent research supports the claim 
that sovereign debt markets may be characterized by “quiet experimentation.”262 
If that is true, more robust models of sovereign debt contracting practices may 
need to account for a messier reality, one in which contracts differ in multiple 
ways.263 
Indeed, there seems little reason to limit this conclusion to sovereign bond 
contracts. In a variety of contexts, the term “boilerplate” may obscure a more 
diverse set of contracting practices. Even boilerplate contracts, after all, can be 
expected to contain some mix of standard and custom terms.264 The important 
question raised by network theory—whether contracts reflect an optimal balance 
between standardization and customization—cannot be answered without a clear 
sense of how the parties have drawn that balance. Thus, enforcement-related 
terms serve as another reminder that actual contracting practices can be 
surprisingly diverse.265 
 
259. See supra notes 218–20 and accompanying text for a discussion of CACs. 
260. Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 993 (noting that prior studies comparing English- to New 
York-law bonds assumed that bonds were identical except with respect to use of CACs); see also 
Torbjörn Becker, Anthony Richards & Yunyong Thaicharoen, Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard: 
Are Collective Action Clauses Costly?, 61 J. INT’L ECON. 127, 128 (2003) (studying effect on price of 
bonds of including CACs); Eichengreen & Mody, supra note 219, at 1–16 (same). 
261. Given the difficulty of enforcing sovereign debt obligations, see supra text accompanying 
notes 6–17, and the limited attention they have received, see supra text accompanying note 135, one 
might argue that enforcement-related terms are relatively minor components of sovereign bond 
contracts. But this overlooks the central role choice of forum and other enforcement-related terms 
may play in determining the significance of the major recent innovations in sovereign debt contracting 
practices: for example, the widespread inclusion of CACs in New York-law bonds, or the creative use 
of pari passu clauses to impede restructuring efforts. Litigation may play a significant role in shaping 
the ultimate meaning and validity of these innovations. 
262. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 222, at 18. 
263. See, e.g., Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 993 (“Our examination of sovereign bond 
contracts suggests that it is problematic to lump all the New York contracts together as being 
identically situated in terms of the ease of restructuring them.”). 
264. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 32, at 266 (explaining contracts as combinations of default 
and custom terms). 
265. Another example of significant variance in supposedly boilerplate contracts involves 
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These results also implicate a larger body of scholarship examining the 
conditions under which innovation is likely to occur. This literature yields a 
number of hypotheses. Some theories link innovation to structural characteristics 
such as firm size and market power. For example, one prediction is that large 
firms, and those with greater market power, are most likely to innovate.266 These 
firms have the size and scope to justify the investments, and capture the gains, 
associated with innovation.267 A competing hypothesis predicts innovation by 
firms with little market power and greater exposure to competitive pressure.268 
A related sociological literature links innovation to party status and 
suggests that innovation may occur among high-status and low-status firms.269 
The theoretical basis for this prediction is that both high- and low-status firms 
are securely established as players (or nonplayers) in the relevant category and 
therefore have little to gain by conforming to audience expectations concerning 
“proper” behavior by category members.270 Thus, high-status players are secure 
in their group membership and may innovate to differentiate themselves from 
competing firms or brand themselves as market leaders.271 Low-status firms are 
not likely to be perceived as “players” no matter what they do.272 They may 
innovate to establish a niche in a competitive marketplace populated by more 
established firms.273 There is empirical support for the view that innovation may 
occur among both high- and low-status players.274 
Despite these theoretical and empirical grounds for expecting innovation by 
less-established and low-status players, the sovereign debt and boilerplate 
literatures have focused primarily on players with high status and significant 
 
manufacturing contracts in the automotive industry. See Omri Ben-Shahar & James J.  White,  
Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957–58 
(2006) (studying form contracts drafted by Original Equipment Manufacturers). 
266. W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation: Lots of 
Talk, Little Action?, 42 J. ECON. LITERATURE 116, 119 (2004). 
267. Id. 
268. Id. at 120; see also Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 935–36 (describing these theories as 
applied to contract innovation). 
269. Damon J. Phillips & Ezra W. Zuckerman, Middle-Status Conformity:  Theoretical  
Restatement and Empirical Demonstration in Two Markets, 107 AM. J. SOC. 379, 383–90 (2001). 
270. Id. at 384–85. 
271. Id. at 385. 
272. Id. 
273. E.g., Michael J. Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and Private 
Lawmaking, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 423, 451 (1993). 
274. See Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Economics of Limited Liability: An Empirical 
Study of New York Law Firms, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 107, 155 (focusing on New York law firms’ 
adoption of LLP form and concluding “elite firms adopted the new LLP form far more slowly than did 
their less elite New York counterparts”); Phillips & Zuckerman, supra note 269, at 411–15 (studying 
law firms in Silicon Valley and finding that low- and high-status firms were most likely to adopt family 
law practices, traditionally viewed as a low-status practice area); Powell, supra note 273, at 451 
(focusing on development of poison pill antitakeover device and concluding: “Lacking the stable client 
base of older established firms, newcomers may have to adopt a specialist strategy in order to attract 
clients and find their niche. The development of new legal devices and strategies heightens their 
visibility and marketability to potential clients.”). 
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market power. With respect to sovereign issuers, for example, most observers 
trace the move from unanimous action clauses to CACs in New York-law bonds 
to Mexico’s decision to include a CAC in a 2003 bond issuance.275 This view 
dovetails neatly with the prediction that high-status players are likely to drive 
innovation.276 Indeed, one impetus behind the decision may have been Mexico’s 
desire to distinguish itself as a leader among sovereign issuers.277 The sovereign 
debt and boilerplate literatures also highlight the role of large, repeat-player 
intermediaries, especially lawyers and underwriters.278 For example, Professors 
Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati attribute the diffusion of CACs throughout New 
York-law bonds to high volume issuer’s counsel such as Cleary Gottlieb.279 By 
contrast, looking at corporate bonds, Professors Marcel Kahan and Michael 
Klausner find that high volume underwriters play a role in coordinating issuers’ 
contract choices but no evidence that law firms play a similar role.280 
My findings tell a similar story, but with a caveat discussed below. I did not 
set out to explore the role of law firms and underwriters in producing contract 
change, but my findings generally support the notion that high-volume 
intermediaries play an important role in designing and disseminating contract 
terms. Because I do not always have the first bond in which an issuer included an 
arbitration clause, I cannot be certain which law firms and underwriters were 
involved at that time. As a rough proxy, however, I can look to the firms 
involved in the earliest issuance in the sample. The resulting picture is consistent 
with the view that high-volume intermediaries can drive contract change. For 
example, for each issuer of English law bonds that permit arbitration, Allen & 
Overy or Linklaters acted as underwriter’s counsel on the earliest issuance in the 
sample.281 These firms are major players; one or the other represented either the 
issuer or the underwriter on most of the English-law issuances in my sample.282 
 
275. E.g., Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 960; Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 5, at 1698. But see 
Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 222, at 6 (noting that “active experimentation” with CAC terms 
continues among relatively small issuers in London market for New York- and English-law bonds). 
276. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 5, at 1698 (“Mexico’s sound economy and sterling reputation 
made it the perfect first mover.”). But see id. at 1628 (noting that Kazakhstan had previously included 
CAC in bond issuance but that “no one seemed to notice”). 
277. See id. at 1696 (exploring Mexico’s initial adoption of CACs and concluding that “[t]o the 
extent Mexico wanted to use the CAC incident to create a perception of autonomy and leadership, it 
was wildly successful”). 
278. Large law firms, for example, may devise new terms to solve frequently  encountered  
problems “with the incentive to diffuse their invention[s] in the market.” Id. at 1680–81. 
279. Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 971–76. 
280. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 753–60. Departing from the Choi-Gulati and Kahan- 
Klausner focus on high-volume intermediaries, Professors Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati tell a 
somewhat different story with respect to Mexico’s initial decision to include CACs in its 2003 bonds. 
Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 5, at 1680–82. The market participants they interviewed attributed the 
decision to officials at the Mexican Finance Ministry without significant pressure from lawyers or 
underwriters. Id. 
281. Allen & Overy acted as underwriter’s counsel in issuances by Estonia (2002) and Ukraine 
(2000), and Linklaters acted as underwriter’s counsel in issuances by Georgia (2008) and the Slovak 
Republic (1999). 
282. Overall, Allen & Overy acted as underwriter’s counsel in eight of the forty-six issuances 
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By focusing on underwriter’s counsel, and not issuer’s counsel or the 
underwriters themselves, I do not mean to weigh in on extant debates over which 
set of intermediaries is more likely to produce and disseminate contract terms.283 
Indeed, I have already described at least one occasion on which a change in the 
issuer’s arbitration clause appears traceable to the law firm representing the 
issuer.284 Rather, I emphasize only that my findings suggest that researchers are 
right to focus on major intermediaries as agents of contract change. 
The caveat is that much of the arbitration usage is by less-established and 
lower-status issuers, such as Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine, and the Slovak Republic. 
This pattern is consistent with predictions of innovation among smaller and low- 
status players, as well as with recent research finding some smaller issuers 
engaged in “active experimentation” with CAC terms.285 But the theory 
underlying these predictions may not be a good fit for the pattern I observe. That 
theory emphasizes that lower-status players may feel less pressure to conform to 
audience norms concerning “proper” behavior.286 As a result, even modest 
potential benefits may be sufficient to induce departures from the norm.287 
Extending this theory to the sovereign debt context, we might explain the use of 
arbitration by relatively low-status issuers as attempts to distinguish their bonds 
from those of competing issuers by adding arbitration to a menu of traditional 
disputing options.288 Yet this seems an awkward explanation for the pattern of 
arbitration use. If it is indeed the case that issuers primarily use arbitration when 
there is doubt as to the enforceability of foreign court judgments,289 then 
arbitration effectively substitutes for the standard in cases where, for one reason 
or another, the standard cannot be used. Put differently, innovation occurs 
because the standard is unavailable or unsatisfactory, not because lower-status 
issuers feel less pressure to conform to the standard or because they need to 
distinguish their bonds in a crowded marketplace. 
 
 
(17.4%) and as issuer’s counsel in another thirteen (18.3%). Linklaters acted as underwriter’s counsel 
in sixteen issuances (34.8%) and as issuer’s counsel in another three (6.5%). Both firms were involved 
in two of the issuances. Thus, one firm or the other represented either the issuer or the underwriters in 
thirty-eight of the forty-six English-law issuances (82.6%). 
283. Compare Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 975–76 (finding evidence that high-volume 
issuer’s counsel, but not high-volume underwriter’s counsel or underwriters, were associated with 
switch to CACs), with Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 753–60 (finding evidence that 
underwriters, but not law firms, play a role in coordinating issuers’ selection of bond terms and in 
promoting diffusion of learning benefits). 
284. Recall that, in 2001, El Salvador changed its arbitration clause  to  incorporate  nearly  
verbatim provisions that had long been included in Brazilian bonds, and that the agent responsible for  
this change appears to have been Arnold & Porter, the law firm representing both issuers. See supra   
text accompanying notes 207–11 for a discussion of this change. 
285. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 222, at 6. 
286. See supra notes 269, 272 and accompanying text for a discussion of the theory behind low- 
status players’ pressure to conform. 
287. E.g., Phillips & Zuckerman, supra note 269, at 385. 
288. This explanation would best apply to the former Soviet republics. See supra notes 154–55  
and accompanying text for a discussion of traditional disputing options in various jurisdictions. 
289. See supra notes 156–61 and accompanying text for examples of this use of arbitration. 
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It is unclear which of these views best describes the adoption of arbitration 
clauses in sovereign bonds. The latter seems more consistent with the generally 
overlooked status of choice of forum terms,290 and also with the fact that issuers 
who use arbitration disclose, but hardly advertise, that fact.291 But no definitive 
answer is available at this point. At a minimum, however, these findings provide 
further evidence that innovation can occur among lower-status players. And they 
suggest that the usual theoretical explanations may not account for the full range 
of such innovation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Is the relative absence of arbitration clauses from sovereign bond contracts 
a puzzle to be solved? As it turns out, perhaps not. The theoretical case for 
arbitration is uncertain. There is no reason to dismiss it out of hand as a potential 
forum for resolving sovereign debt disputes, but there is certainly no reason to 
presume that issuers or bondholders should strongly prefer it. The empirical 
reality is consistent with this skeptical view of sovereign debt arbitration. Most 
issuers use sovereign immunity terms to confer enforcement benefits similar to 
those claimed for arbitration. This practice reduces arbitration’s potential 
advantages, while avoiding its potential uncertainty and cost. And where 
arbitration’s enforcement benefits are most plausible, it is used with some 
frequency. At a minimum, these patterns suggest that theories of contract 
stickiness are not necessary to explain the choice of dispute resolution term. 
When combined with the surprising diversity of practices across issuers, these 
patterns also suggest that the benefits of widespread use may be overstated in 
this context. 
More broadly, the diversity of contracting practices suggests that sovereign 
bond contracts may be less uniform than is often assumed and that smaller, 
lower-status issuers may be sources of experimentation and innovation. Major 
intermediaries like law firms and underwriters may play a role in designing and 
disseminating contract terms, but bit players, too, may be worthy of attention. 
And perhaps most of all, these findings serve as a reminder that we should not 
simply presume that standardization seriously impacts contract choice. Default 
rules and terms may indeed be sticky. But just how sticky is the question, and it 








290. For example, public officials have devoted little attention to these terms. See supra note 135 
and accompanying text for a discussion of public officials’ efforts to identify optimal bond terms. 
291. Typically, the disclosure documents prominently disclose the risk that bondholders will not 
be able to enforce judgments against defaulted issuers, and the arbitration provision is often discussed 
in this section as well. E.g., THE REP. OF EL SAL., supra note 248, at iv. 
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Appendix 
Governing Law and Submission to Jurisdiction292 
The Fiscal Agency Agreement and the Notes shall be construed and 
interpreted in accordance with the law of the State of New York, which shall 
govern them and any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to any of   
them, without reference to conflicts of laws principles. The Republic irrevocably 
agrees for the benefit of each Holder of Notes that the courts of the State of New 
York and of the United States sitting in The City of New York, Borough of 
Manhattan, shall have non-exclusive jurisdiction to settle any disputes which may 
arise out of or in connection with the Fiscal Agency Agreement or the Notes and 
that, accordingly, any suit, action or proceedings arising out of or in connection 
therewith (together referred to as “Related Proceedings”) may be brought in any 
such courts. Related Proceedings may also be brought in the courts of the 
Republic. The Republic irrevocably submits to the jurisdiction of the courts 
referred to in this Condition for purposes of any Related Proceedings. 
To the extent that the Republic may in any jurisdiction claim or acquire for 
itself or its assets immunity (sovereign or otherwise) from suit, execution, 
attachment (whether in aid of execution, before judgment or otherwise) or other 
legal process (whether through service or notice or otherwise), the Republic 
irrevocably agrees for the benefit of the Holders of Notes not to claim, and 
irrevocably waives, such immunity, to the fullest extent permitted by the laws of 
such jurisdiction. The waiver of immunity in this paragraph shall have the fullest 
scope permitted under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 of the 
United States and is intended to be irrevocable for purposes of such Act but 
shall otherwise constitute a limited and specific waiver for the purpose of the 
Fiscal Agency Agreement and the Notes and under no circumstances shall it be 
interpreted as a general waiver by the Republic or a waiver of immunity in 
respect of property that is used solely or principally for official purposes (such as 
ambassadorial and consular real property and buildings and the contents thereof, 
or any bank accounts of embassies or consulates to the extent of monies 
maintained therein for ambassadorial, consular or other official purposes, but 
not commercial purposes, in each case necessary for the proper official, 
ambassadorial or consular functioning of the Republic). 
The Republic irrevocably appoints the person who from time to time is the 
Consul of the Republic in The City of New York as it [sic] agent in the United 
States to receive service of process in any Related Proceedings in The City of 
New York based on or in connection with the Fiscal Agency Agreement or any 







292. THE LEBANESE REP., supra note 21, at 99–100. 
